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ABSTRACT
In recognition of the socio-economic imbalances inherited from the past and the
abject poverty experienced by many, the people of South Africa adopted a
Constitution fully committed to protecting socio-economic rights and advancing
social justice. Apartheid constituted a violation of every internationally
recognised human right. Seen in this light the emphasis on socio-economic
rights in the new South African Constitution represents a commitment to
guarantee to everyone in society a certain minimum standard of living below
which they will not be allowed to fall.
As the Constitution recognises socio-economic rights as justiciable rights, they
can be of assistance to those who are unable to support themselves when
challenging the state for the non-delivery of basic services. The duty to deliver
the services lies first with the state and the court becomes involved only once it
is alleged that the state has failed to fulfil its duty.
The primary purpose of the study is aimed at determining the effectiveness of
the South African Human Rights Commission in monitoring court orders in
respect of the implementation of socio-economic rights. Non-Governmental
Organisations, involved in the promotion and protection of human rights
including socio-economic rights, cannot be left out of the process.
It is argued that where the Courts issue structural interdicts, which have of late
been used by them, albeit not enough in the context of socio-economic rights,
they are responsible for the implementation of such orders. It is also argued that
the South African Human Rights Commission and NGOs must be enjoined to
ensure that court orders are better implemented. Court orders in respect of
socio-economic rights in almost all the cases to date were neither implemented
nor monitored adequately.
(ii)
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OPSOMMING
Ter erkenning van die sosio-ekonomiese ongelykhede wat post-apartheid Suid-
Afrika geërf het en die volslae armoede waaraan talle Suid-Afrikaners
onderwerp is, het die mense van Suid-Afrika 'n grondwet aanvaar wat verbonde
is tot die beskerming van sosio-ekonomiese regte en die bevordering van
maatskaplike geregtigheid. Apartheid het elke internasionaal-erkende mensereg
geskend. Teen hierdie agtergrond verteenwoordig die klem op sosio-
ekonomiese regte in die nuwe Suid-Afrikaanse grondwet 'n verbondenheid
daartoe om vir elkeen in die maatskappy 'n bepaalde minimum lewensstandaard
te waarborg, waaronder hulle nie toegelaat sal word om te sak nie.
Aangesien die grondwet sosio-ekonomiese regte as beregbare regte erken, kan
hierdie regte van nut wees vir mense wat hulself nie kan onderhou nie, as hulle
die staat uitdaag omdat basiese dienste nie gelewer word nie. Die plig om
dienste te lewer berus eerstens by die staat, met die gevolg dat die hof eers
betrokke raak as die staat nie daarin slaag om sy plig te vervul nie.
Die primêre doel van hierdie studie is om vas te stel hoe effektief die Suid-
Afrikaanse Menseregtekommissie is met die monitering van hofbevele wat
betrekking het op die verwesenliking van sosio-ekonomiese regte. Nie-
regeringsinstansies wat betrokke is by die bevordering en beserkming van
menseregte, met inbegrip van sosio-ekonomiese regte, kan egter nie uit die
proses gelaat word nie.
In hierdie studie word aangevoer dat waar die strukturele interdikte gee, soos
wat in die onlangse verlede gebeur het, selfs al is dit nie genoeg in die konteks
van sosio-ekonomiese regte nie, hulle ook verantwoordelikheid is daarvoor dat
sulke bevele uitgevoer word.
Dit word verder gestel dat die Suid-Afrikaanse Menseregtekommissie en nie-
regeringsinstansies moet saamwerk om te verseker dat hofbevele beter uitgevoer
word. Tot op datum is amper geen hofbevele oor sosio-ekonomiese regte
bevredigend uitgevoer of genoegsaam gemoniteer nie.
(iii)
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND
In Motala' swords 1, South Africa's democratic elections in 1994 under the
Interim Constitution' and the inauguration of Nelson Mandela as the President
of the country marked the beginning of a truly historic chapter of constitutional
change in South Africa. The elections signified the end of a tyrannical system of
domination, of an order in which widespread oppression and exploitation had
occurred. Since then, the democratically elected leadership in South Africa has
encouraged forgiveness of the perpetrators of what has been termed a crime
against humanity.
As Liebenberg and Pillay note, despite the scars of apartheid which the
majority of the black population bears and the manifestation of the vestiges of
apartheid in inequalities in wealth, access to property and basic facilities such as
housing, health and education, the aftermath of the elections has seen a
remarkable period of tranquillity and optimism'. Instead of seeking revenge, the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established under the Promotion of
National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 for the purpose of
investigating gross human rights violations and to grant amnesty on condition of
a full, truthful disclosure of acts with a political objective.
The 1996 Constitution" completes the fundamental change in the legal
order heralded by the 1994 elections. As the 1996 Constitution is the product of
a generally elected Constitutional Assembly, it should be no surprise that the
drafters recognised the socio-economic imbalances inherited by post-apartheid
South Africa and the abject poverty experienced by many South Africans, by
adopting a Constitution fully committed to protecting socio-economic rights and
advancing social justice. According to Heyns.i constitutions born from
IMotala, Z. 'Socio-Economic Rights, Federalism and the Courts: Comparative Lessons for
South Africa' (1995) SALf at 61.
2 Act 200 of 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the "Interim Constitution").
3 Liebenberg, S. and Pillay, K. Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa (2000) at 21.
4 Act 108 of 1996(hereinafter referred to as the Constitution).
5 Heyns, C. "Taking Socio-Economic Rights Seriously: The Domestic Reporting Procedure and
the Role of the South African Human Rights Commission" (1997) 30 De Jure at 195.
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successful liberation struggles are inevitably retroactive. They are written by
people who are determined to prevent history from repeating itself. Heyns notes
that apartheid constituted a violation of virtually every internationally
recognised civil and political as well socio-economic right. In light of the past,
the entrenchment of socio-economic rights in the new South African
Constitution is supposed to guarantee to everyone a certain minimum standard
of living, below which they will not be allowed to fall.
Since South Africa was previously governed in terms of a system of
parliamentary supremacy, no court of law could declare a statute of Parliament
invalid. The new Constitution marks a departure from this tradition by providing
for an entrenched Bill of Rights and judicial review, as is the case in other
countries such as the United States, Canada and Germany." Chapter Two of
South Africa's 1996 Constitution contains an extended list of universally
accepted fundamental rights. These rights are considered so important that no
organ of state may transgress them. Even Parliament must respect these
provisions and at the centre of the Bill of Rights there is a new commitment to
substantive social justice, represented most visibly by the socio-economic rights
entrenched in Chapter Two.
1.2 THE AlM OF THE STUDY
The aim of this study is to determine how court orders in respect of the socio-
economic rights should be implemented and, in particular, how the
implementation of the orders can be monitored in order to ensure that they are
successfully implemented in South Africa. The main focus in the study will be
on the monitoring of court orders in the field of socio-economic rights. The
problem that we are currently faced with is that litigants achieve victories in
courts, but those victories are not translated into reality. These successful
litigants are not afforded the relief envisaged by the court order. For this
purpose, the following objectives are pursued:
to provide an overview of the literature on the status of socio-economic
rights and of monitoring processes;
6 See Motala (note 1 above) at 64.
2
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to examine the successes in the implementation and monitoring of court
orders;
to determine the problems encountered in the process;
to make recommendations for the improved implementation of court
orders in respect of socio-economic rights and more rigorous
monitoring.
1.3 STATEMENTOF THE PROBLEM
The recent increase in a resort to litigation in order to ensure the realisation of
socio-economic rights shows that checks and balances are necessary, even
where the government professes to be committed to the achievement of social
justice. For this reason, the drafters of the 1996 Constitution charged the
judiciary with the task to review decisions affecting socio-economic rights and
people of our country. Much of the debate has focused on the legitimacy of
court intervention in the area of socio-economic rights. The problems do not
stop there. Even if one assumes, as I will do, that such intervention is legitimate,
the problem of government compliance with court orders remains. Some form
of monitoring of the implementation of these orders is essential. The question is:
which institution or institutions should be tasked with monitoring? Should it be
the courts, the SAHRC and NGOs or the government itself?
1.3.1 Problems with the role of the courts
Questions about the enforceability of socio-economic rights tend to be raised
whenever attempts are made to litigate about these rights in a court of law. This
debate is over. Socio-economic rights are now protected in the South African
Constitution and they must be regarded to be enforceable through courts of law.
However, there is little jurisprudence or literature on the monitoring of
implementation of court orders in respect of these rights, and the
implementation of court orders remains beset with problems.
The recognition that socio-economic rights are enforceable is important,
but several other problems remain. In this thesis I will investigate the
3
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monitoring of the implementation of court orders. This is of course not the only
problem. A lack of awareness of legal processes prevents those most affected
from using law and litigation to enforce socio-economic rights. Even those who
are aware of their rights, find that the judicial enforcement of socio-economic
rights requires skills that lay persons do not have. Even if the rules are
simplified, the reality will always be that poor people will not be able to use the
courts because they cannot afford the exorbitant legal costs. The only hope for
the poor is that they organise themselves and find sponsors willing to support
their cause. The South African Constitution provides for a class action and an
action to be brought in the public interest in sections 38(c) and (d). These
provisions should be used if social and economic constitutional commands are
not properly honoured. It is obviously in the public interest to implement socio-
economic rights properly. Communities should therefore be afforded a standing
before the court in order to exercise pressure on the state to respect their
constitutional rights. However, even if the community is afforded standing,
there remains the problem of finding willing and able institutions to sponsor
such class actions for the affected people. Not many sponsors have presented
themselves thus far. Litigation is a slow and expensive manner of enforcing
socio-economic rights. Moreover it requires skills and a kind of commitment to
pro bono work that very few legal practitioners have.
Another problem is that the courts will not be able to distinguish
between the government's inability to implement a specific right, and its
unwillingness to do so unless it is provided with the results of intensive
research. Such research is time-consuming and costly and it has to be co-
ordinated with the litigation strategy of the applicants.
Another factor that has hampered the development of a strong socio-
economic jurisprudence has been the vague content of the rights. Some say
socio-economic rights lack the precision of "first-generation" rights. The
meaning of the right to "access" to housing is, for example, obscure. However,
the lack of clarity is due largely to the fact that socio-economic rights have not
received sufficient attention from the courts, academics and other agencies. It is
a "catch-22" situation. The vague content of the rights discourages the very
4
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litigation that is necessary to provide greater clarity about the contents of the
rights.
Finally, the problems with the enforcement of court orders must be
urgently addressed. There is nothing more disheartening than overcoming all the
obstacles mentioned above and achieving victory in the courts, only to be
denied relief as a result of the failure of the responsible organ of state to
implement the court's order. Courts are not in a position to enforce their own
orders. They do not even have the staff to monitor whether their orders are
implemented. Another institution will have to be identified to fulfil this function
and the obvious candidate is the South African Human Rights Commission.
1.3.2 Problems with the role of the South African Human Rights
Commission
To add a monitoring function to the tasks of the SAHRC is not without
difficulties. The Commission already lacks resources to fulfil its function. No
budget is designated by the government for the monitoring of court orders,
which will make it very difficult for the Commission to carry out this additional
task.
The collaboration between the government departments and the SAHRC
is minimal. Some departments, such as Welfare, Health, Local Government and
Housing in the Eastern Cape, have for example been subpoenaed to appear
before the Commission for their failure to respond to the questionnaire that was
issued by the Commission. The lack of healthy co-operation will hamper any
effort of the Commission to monitor the implementation of court orders.
Another problem is that the court almost never requires the SAHRC to
monitor the implementation of its orders. In the few instances when they have
done so, the courts have not laid down proper guidelines as to what it is that has
to be monitored by the Commission. Time frames are also not generally laid
down for the Commission to report back about the progress made regarding the
effective implementation of orders.
The lack of communication has not only affected the ability of the
SAHRC to monitor the implementation of court orders. Sometimes those
5
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directly responsible for implementing the order were not properly informed. The
Grootboom case is a case in point. In this case, the Constitutional Court did not
inform the Mayor of the area concerned where it had ordered the government to
honour its obligation. This borders on negligence on the part of the court.
1.3.3 Problems with the role of the Non- governmental Organisations
Non-governmental organisations are also not ideal institutions to task with the
monitoring of court orders. Not only do they currently lack the skills to monitor
the implementation of court orders, but no guidelines exist for the performance
of such a monitoring function. As I have stated above, such guidelines will first
have to be developed before the monitoring function can be entrusted to the
SAHRC and NGOs.
NGOs also complain about geographical and structural constraints that
restrict their involvement in the implementation of socio-economic rights," An
NGO is dependent on funding for the project it undertakes. NGOs will therefore
need to secure long term funding if they are serious about fulfilling a monitoring
function.
Despite the difficulties, it is of absolute importance to involve NGOs.
Their lack of participation undoubtedly contributes to the lack of awareness
amongst indigent people of their socio-economic rights. Their participation will
also make monitoring more credible, as most NGOs operate independently from
the government.
1.3.4 Conclusion
In the light of the problems described above, the main question that will be
addressed in this study is how the implementation of court orders in respect of
socio-economic rights should be monitored.
7 Craven, M. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective
on its Development (1995) at 80.
6
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1.4 ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE STUDY
I assume for purposes of this thesis that the government is under an obligation to
implement socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights. In terms of section 7(2)
of the constitution, the state is under an obligation to respect, protect, promote
and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights. The duty to respect a human right
implies an immediate obligation on the state to refrain from legislative or other
actions, which interfere in people's access to or enjoyment of the right in
question. The duty to protect requires the state to prevent the right from being
undermined by the conduct of private actors. The duty to promote and fulfil
requires the state to take legislative and other measures to assist individuals and
groups to obtain access to their rights." Some argue that the internal limitations
limit the enforceability of socio-economic rights. 9 I will address this argument
in Chapter Four below.
The study further departs from the viewpoint that the socio-economic
rights guaranteed in the Constitution are not implemented adequately. While the
whole world admires South Africa for its modem and progressive Constitution,
it is time that South Africans should start to focus on the implementation of the
rights. If the rights are not implemented, there is little value in the admirable
wording of the Constitution.
The government's commitment towards the realisation of these rights is
reflected in the enormous number of national programmes it has put in place.
Some of these have, however, failed. It is generally agreed that housing has still
not been provided adequately, health care is beridden with problems, children's
rights have not been implemented fully and education leaves much to be
desired.
In order to start addressing the problems, socio-economic rights have to
be given priority when allocations are made in the national budget. However, as
I shall argue in Chapter Four, even a lack of resources does not absolve the state
of its minimum obligations to provide for the basic necessities of its citizens. In
the present climate, with huge amounts of money being spent on the acquisition
8 Liebenberg S. "Report ofa Joint Workshop Organised by the Community Law Centre
(University of the Western Cape) and the Human Rights Centre (University of Pretoria) (1997)
at 17.
7
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of arms, it is particularly distressing that the government sought to justify its
failure to honour the socio-economic obligations imposed upon it by the
Constitution in the case of Soobramoney, lO by arguing that it did not have the
necessary resources to implement these rights.
Budlender!' ascribes such failures to the enormity of the challenges the
state faces in this regard. The reason for the failure to implement "second-
generation" rights, he argues, does not seem to be a lack of commitment, but
rather a lack of skill, experience and focus in government's work, coupled with
limited resources in an economy that is not growing:
"The problem is that government is trying to do too much at the same
time. In the typical department dealing with social and economic issues
we have more major new programmes than a stable, well-organised and
well-resourced government would attempt in two decades. Our
government is not yet stable, or well-organised, or well-resourced - yet
we are trying to introduce all of these ambitious new programmes
simultaneously.t''?
Effective realisation is further thwarted by fraud and corruption on the part of
state officials who are responsible for the delivery of the socio-economic
needs." Some state officials in the Eastern Cape have, for example, been
charged with fraud and misappropriation of the funds, which were meant for the
realisation of the socio-economic needs. The case of Mrs Nolundi Yantal4 is a
case in point where she misappropriated funds with her common law husband
and she was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment. In a similar case, Dr
Bevan Goqwana, the Minister of Health, was suspended pending an
investigation for corruption in which he was later cleared of the allegations
against him.
Whatever the exact cause, the reality is that many of the programmes set
up by the state for the implementation of socio-economic rights do not appear to
meet the minimum standards required for their effective realisation. In the
9 Sections 26(2) and 27(2).
JO Soobramoney v Minister of Health KwaZulu-NataI1998(1) SA 765 (CC) at para 11.
Il Bundiender G. "Facing the Challenges ofImplementation" (1999) 1 ESR Review at 15.
12 Ibid at 15.
13 SAHRC, "Socio-Economic Rights Report: 1999-2000", 15 September 2000 at 178.
14 She was the official in the Department of Welfare now called "Social Development".
8
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Grootboom case." for example, it was held that the programmes for the
realisation of these rights fell short of the standard required because they had
not catered for emergencies.
Government has been given more than sufficient time to implement
socio-economic rights since the coming into force of the 1996 Constitution. The
time has arrived when government's failure to implement socio-economic rights
can only be addressed by the enforcement of these rights by the courts. In other
words, if the government cannot effectively implement the rights in question,
the court's function to implement these rights is triggered. I will assume for
purposes of this thesis that the time has come for the courts to become more
active in the field of socio-economic rights.
At the moment, the courts are not in an ideal position to fulfil this role.
However, the courts are themselves responsible for improving the process of
enforcement. While the simplification and speeding up of the litigation process
alone will be an important step towards more efficient implementation of
"second-generation" rights, more detailed measures seem to be needed. One of
these is to establish a system for the monitoring of court orders.
1.5 THE VALUEANDLIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
Since the study seeks to ensure the effective and adequate implementation of
court orders in respect of socio-economic rights, the main value is its attempt to
describe how the process of the implementation of socio-economic rights
through the courts can be streamlined. This study is limited to the examination
of how the monitoring institutions can effectively and properly monitor the
implementation of court orders in respect of socio-economic rights.
1.6 SEQUENCEOF CHAPTERS
Chapter Two examines the provisions regarding socio-economic rights in the
South African Constitution in the light of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in order to determine the status of these
152000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC).
9
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rights internationally and within the South African context. The chapter also
examines the different interpretations of socio-economic rights in South African
law.
Chapter Three outlines the monitoring role of the SAHRC as provided
for in section 184 of the Constitution with due regard to the First16 and Second
Socio-Economic Report". Itwill also be argued that SAHRC and NGOs have to
be more directly involved in the area of the monitoring of the implementation of
court orders in respect of socio-economic rights.
Chapter Four provides an analysis of court cases to determine the extent
to which the Constitutional Court and other courts have managed to enforce
socio-economic rights. I will also determine whether the SAHRC have been
able to monitor the implementation of court orders in respect of these rights
meaningfully. The analysis of cases makes it possible to estimate the efficiency
of the implementation of court orders in respect of these rights, while the results
of the interviews with members of the SAHRC and NGOs will provide some
indicators of the problems that are preventing an adequate monitoring process
from developing.
Chapter Five contains a summary and recommendations towards the
effective implementation of court orders in respect of socio-economic rights
guaranteed in the Constitution.
16 SAHRC, "Monitoring Socio-Economic Rights In South Africa Report 1998-1999".
17 SABRC, "Monitoring Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa Report 1999-2000".
10
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CHAPTER TWO
STATUS OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The South African Constitution 1 does not draw any distinction between civil
and political rights and socio-economic rights. The two types of rights are
interrelated and interdependent. Indeed, the international position dating back to
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is that the two sets of rights as
enumerated in the two covenants (the International Covenant on Economic
Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights) are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated.'
The close relationship that exists between the two sets of rights means
that both require permanent protection and promotion if they are to be fully
realised. The ideal of human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want can
only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone enjoys economic,
social and cultural rights.
This chapter is meant to illustrate that the two sets of rights are
dependent on each other. No right can be enjoyed without the proper protection
of the other. For the effective realisation of one, the other right must also be
recognised. In addition, the Chapter shows that both sets of rights are recognised
domestically and internationally as universal human rights.
The apartheid legacy of social and economic deprivation is a major
source of inequality in South African society. It undermines human dignity and
the freedom to participate fully in the democratic institutions and processes.
Among comparable middle-income developing countries, South Africa has one
of the worst records in terms of social indicators (housing, health, education,
etc.) and income distribution.3 Poverty in the country also has strong racial,
IAct 108 of 1996.
2 Craven, M. International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on
its Development (1995) at 24.
3 Pienaar, 1. "The Impact of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of
Land Act of 1998 on Homelessness and Unlawful Occupation Within the Present Statutory
Framework" (1999) 3 Stellenbosch Law Review 370 at 373.
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gender, age and rural dimensions. This section deals with the manner in which
the policy of apartheid has affected socio-economic development.
The Constitution reflects a heightened concern for the position of groups
In vulnerable and disadvantaged circumstances." The inclusion of socio-
economic rights in the Bill of Rights represents a commitment to overcome the
country's dismal human rights legacy and accords with the underlying values
and purposes of the Constitution. Many provisions are aimed at redressing the
legal and structural patterns of inequality and disadvantage that exist in our
society. This requires the state not only to refrain from passing laws and
adopting policies that undermine the rights in the Bill of Rights, but also to take
positive measures in order to protect and fulfil these rights." Justice Kriegler
has, for example, remarked that:
"We do not operate under a constitution in which the purpose was to
place limits on the governmental control. Our constitution aims at
establishing freedom and equality in a grossly disparate society."
This attitude could play a critical role in guiding our interpretation of socio-
economic rights. By suggesting that the courts should be particularly alert to the
impact of state action or legislation on groups living in marginalised, vulnerable
and disadvantaged circumstances in South Africa, it indicates how the state
could deal with the inequalities of the past in conjunction with the courts.
Legislation that creates barriers that impede access by vulnerable groups to the
socio-economic benefits provided for in the Bill of Rights should, for example,
be avoided.
The lack of access to these rights by particular groups may, however,
also be due to the absence of appropriate policies and legislation. Thus a failure
on the part of the state to enact regulatory legislation and to implement the law
may expose these groups to abuse and exploitation in the private sector.
Socio-economic rights have not had the benefit of a long tradition of
interpretation by judicial and quasi-judicial bodies. Their content and scope are
consequently undeveloped and in the process of evolution. There are also
4 S v Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) at para 34.
5 Section 7(2).
6 Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 (5) BCLR 658 (CC) at para 147.
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relatively few sources of comparative constitutional law to guide interpretation
in this area. Because socio-economic rights have consistently been affirmed as
part of universal human rights, international law is perhaps the most valuable
guide to interpretation. Even under international law, however, individual
petition procedures are not used to enforce socio-economic rights although there
appears to be some developments in the area.
The above paragraphs reflect the difficulty m dealing with SOCIO-
economic rights because there is a relative scarcity of jurisprudence that will
serve as a guide to the interpretation of rights in this area. It also shows that
socio-economic rights have been neglected in the past and this has affected their
development. .
The inclusion of these rights in the Constitution was a step forward
towards realising them. Having considered a series of objections against these
rights, the political parties included them after agreeing that these rights were
universally accepted fundamental rights in international law. South Africa took
a bold step by entrenching these rights in its Constitution. Nationally and
internationally their inclusion was seen as a progressive move, which brought
South Africa in line with the current international practice and established itself
as one of the international role models for the promotion of these rights. Despite
the equal status of the various so-called generations of rights internationally and
locally, reclaiming space for socio-economic rights is still a challenging task
both locally and internationally.
In this Chapter the provisions regarding socio-economic rights in the
South African Constitution will be examined. This will be done in the light of
the meaning of the similar rights in the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights."
The rights in the Constitution include the following:
7 See Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the
Constitution of South Africa 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) at paras 78-79.
8 South Africa signed (on 3rd October 1994) but has not yet ratified the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
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• Section 26, guarantees everyone the right of access to adequate housing
and prohibit arbitrary evictions." This right is recognised in a number of
international human rights instruments'? and in several other domestic
constitutions although in countries such as Namibia, India, etc, the
corresponding provisions are regarded as directive principles of state
policy.
• Section 27 provides for the right to have access to health care services,
sufficient food and water and social security. This section also prohibits
anyone from being refused emergency medical treatment. II This right
was included because of its general acceptance in international human
rights instruments and national Constitutions.V
• Section 28 guarantees every child basic nutrition, shelter, basic health
care services and social services.f In this section the "child" means a
person under the age of eighteen years.
• Section 29 guarantees everyone the right to basic education including
adult basic education. This right is also contained in international
instruments.
9 Section 26 states:
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing.
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right.
(3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an
order of court after considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may
permit arbitrary evictions.
10 See the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 article 25 which provides as follows:
(1) Everyone has the right to a standard ofliving adequate for the health and well being
of himself and of his family, including food ...
Il Section 27 states:
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to:
(a) health care services, including reproductive health care;
(b) sufficient food, water, and
(c) social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their
dependants, appropriate social assistance.
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of the right.
(3) No one may be refused emergency medical treatment
12 Craven (note 2 above) at 361-362.
13 Section 28 declares:
(1) Every child has the right
(b) to family care ...
(e) to be protected from exploitative labour practices ...
14
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Another fundamental right that can be classified as socio-economic right such as
the right to property," is also included in the Bill of Rights. Some
commentators'? are of the view that the relationship between the right to
property and economic and social rights is somewhat strained. While an
effective realisation of social rights calls for redistribution of wealth and
resources, the right to property protects acquired rights and can thus run counter
to social rights."
It is so that the right to property entails that the institution of property is
guaranteed 17 and that acquired property rights are protected from arbitrary
interference.f On the other hand, the right may also contribute to a decent
standard of living and to life in dignity for everyone. Eide has demonstrated that
the right to property can serve as a basis for entitlements that can ensure an
adequate standard of living, while on the other hand it is the basis of
independence and therefore of freedom. 19 Therefore, property rights are closely
connected with socio-economic rights.
2.2 THE STATUS OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN INTER-
NATIONALLAW
This part highlights some international instruments that provide for the
protection of socio-economic rights. The purpose is clearly to determine the
status of these rights within the international legal arena.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides as follows in article 25:
(1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and
well being of himself and of his family, including food, housing, and
medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the
event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other
lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.
14 Section 25.
15 Krause, C. "The Right to Property" in Eide et al (eds) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(1995) at 143.
16 Ibid at 143.
17 Section 25(1).
18 Section 26(3).
19 Eide, A. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1995) at 31.
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(2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All
children whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social
protection.
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provides
in article 11:
(1) The state parties to the present covenant recognise the right of everyone to
an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate
food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living
conditions. The state parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the
realisation of this right, recognising to this effect the essential importance on
international co-operation based on free consent.
(2) The state parties to the present covenant, recognising the fundamental right
of everyone to be free from hunger, shall take, individually and through
international co-operation, the measures, including specific programmes,
which are needed:
(a) To improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of
food by making full use of scientific and technical knowledge, by
disseminating knowledge of the principles of nutrition and by
developing of reforming of agrarian systems in such a way as to
achieve the most efficient development and utilisation of natural
resources;
(b) Taking into account the problems of both food-importing and
exporting countries, to ensure an equitable distribution of world food
supplies in relation to need.
The Convention on the Rights of the Child in article 27 recognises the right of
every child to a standard of living adequate for the child's physical, mental,
spiritual, moral and social development.
In international law two separate International Covenants form the
bedrock of the International Human Rights norms. They are the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights20 and International Covenant on
Economic Social and Cultural Rights. Apart from the entrenchment of socio-
economic rights in the covenant itself, the recognition of these rights is found in
other international human rights instruments such as article 25 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,21 and article 5 of the Convention on All Forms of
Racial Discrimination.22
20 Adopted on 16 December 1966 and came into force on 23 March 1976.
21 Article (22-28).
22 Article 5 states that:
16
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The fact that there are two Covenants illustrates the assumptions about
the nature of these rights. The rationale behind having two separate human
rights covenants lies in assumptions about the nature of each of the two sets of
rights. The fact that it was not possible to include both sets of rights in one
document perpetuates the perception that the rights are different in nature, and
that the socio-economic rights are secondary. This idea was supported by the
distinction between different "generations" of rights with socio-economic rights
placed in the "second generation". The terminology seeks to draw a distinction
between the two sets of rights on the basis that civil and political rights impose a
negative obligation on the state while social, economic and cultural rights
impose a positive obligation.
This assumption about the nature of these rights has affected their
development. This distinction had an adverse impact on the implementation of
socio-economic rights. It generated a belief that socio-economic rights are not
enforceable or justiciable in a court of law. It is therefore the cause of the
traditional perception of socio-economic rights as belonging to a "second
generation" rights of lesser importance than their counterparts, civil and
political rights as "first generation" rights. It is now recognised that the
perception distorts the nature of the two sets of rights. All human rights demand
a combination of negative and positive conduct from the state and varying levels
of resources to implement them.
The mechanisms that have been put in place to ensure the effective
realisation of the socio-economic rights are weak. The problem with socio-
economic rights is not their validity but rather their implementation. The
wording of provisions of the covenant and the relatively weak international
monitoring mechanisms has affected the enforceability of international treaties
on economic and social rights.
(e) Economic, social and cultural rights, in particular:
I. The right to work ... and favourable remuneration
II. The right to form and join trade unions,
III. The right to housing,
IV. The right to public health, medical care, social security, and social
services,
V. The right to education and training,
VI. The right to equal participation in cultural activities,
VII. The right of access to any place intended for use by the general
public such as transport, hotels, restaurants, theatres and parks.
17
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The coming into force of the draft optional protocol on socio-economic
rights adoptedf by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
would certainly be one method of overcoming the weaknesses in the existing
provisions on economic and social rights. This protocol makes provision for
individuals or groups and organisations to submit complaints to the Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.24
The basic obligation imposed by the ICESCR covenant on member
states is to take steps to the maximum of available resources, with a view to
achieving progressively the full realisation of the right by all appropriate means,
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures." This is in line with
the general rule of international law requiring states to take the necessary action
to execute the provisions of the covenant. While the full realisation of the
relevant rights may be achieved progressively, steps towards that goal must be
taken within a reasonably short time after the Covenant is ratified. Such steps
should be "deliberate, concrete and targeted" as clearly as possible towards
meeting the obligations recognised in the covenant. 26
Article 2 of the Covenant places particular emphasis on the adoption of
legislation. Appropriate domestic judicial remedies are also vital for the
effective realisation of the rights in the Covenant. For example, the Committee
considers the element of the right to adequate housing to be enforceable through
the courts_27 These include remedies to prevent or compensate for forced
23 Itwas adopted in December 1996.
24 Article 2 of the Draft Optional Protocol states that:
1. Any individual or group claiming to be a victim of a violation by the state party
concerned of any economic, social and cultural rights recognised in the covenant, or
any individual or group acting on behalf of such claimants, may submit a written
communication to the Committee for examination.
2. State parties to this protocol undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise
of the right to submit a communication and to take all steps necessary to prevent any
persecution or sanctioning of any person or group submitting or seeking to submit a
communication under this Protocol.
25 Article 2( 1) of the Covenant states that:
'Each state to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through
international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the
maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full
realisation of the rights recognised in the present Covenant by all appropriate means,
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures' .
26 Liebenberg, S. "The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and its
Implications for South Africa"(1995) 11 SAJHR at 365.
271bid.
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demolitions and evictions, complaints against public and private landlords in
respect of rent levels, dwelling circumstances, racial or other forms of
discrimination, and any form of discrimination in the allocation and availability
of access to housing. Apart from legislation and judicial remedies, measures of
progressive implementation include those of a financial, educational and
technical nature as well as adoption and implementation of appropriate policies
and detailed plans by the government.
The majority of the articles in the Covenant also specify particular steps,
which the states are obliged to take towards progressive realisation of the
rights." The steps that the states must take to ensure the full realisation of the
rights to health inter alia, include "provision for the reduction of stillbirth-rate
and of infant mortality ... [and] the creation of conditions which would ensure to
all medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness".29
The Committee has emphasised that priority should be given to the
worse-off region and to any specific groups, which appear to be particularly
vulnerable or disadvantaged." Thus the legislation, policies and plans
implementing the obligations under the covenant should be designed to have the
maximum impact on the poorest and most marginalised groups in our society."
The state obligation to realise the rights progressively is qualified by the
phrase "to the maximum of its available resources" in article 2(1). This
qualification recognises the reality that the extent of fulfilment of the rights will
depend on the financial capacity of the state. Scarcity of resources does not
relieve the state of its core minimum obligation. However, the qualification in
no way diminishes the state obligation. Lack of resources in itself would not
allow states to defer indefinitely taking the necessary action to give effect to the
obligations under the Covenant. The state is under a burden to demonstrate that
it has done its utmost within the constraints of its available' resources to satisfy
the rights protected under the Covenant. Thus even where resources are
28 General Comment No 3 'The Nature of the State Parties Obligations Under Article 2( I) of the
Covenant' UN Doc E1l991123.
29 Article 12 of the Covenant quoted by Essop, F. The Constitutional Enforceability of Socio-
Economic Rights with Special Reference to Housing (1999) LLM Thesis, University of Cape
Town at 29.
30 General Comment on People with Disabilities, UN Doc E/C. 12/1994/13.
31 Craven (note 2 above) at 288.
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demonstrably inadequate to attain the desired level of fulfilment of the rights,
state must still monitor the extent of non-realisation and to devise appropriate
remedial strategies and programmes.P
The "available resources" refers to the resources of the country, and are
not to be equated with budgetary appropriateness. They also include the
resources available to the country through international assistance and co-
operation, which are essential components of state funding under the Covenant.
This is particularly important in the light of the dependence of national
economies on global economic trends and policies, especially in developing
countries.r'
It should be noted that the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),
which includes many socio-economic rights, does not contain the qualifying
clause "progressive realisation". Under the CRC, the obligations arise
immediately, only qualified by the phrase "within their means". This shows that
what is special about economic, social and cultural right is only the question of
the availability of means when such are required. The obligations are otherwise
as immediate as are those relating to civil and political rights.
The state furthermore has a "minimum core obligation" to satisfy at least
the essential levels of the rights such as basic nutrition, primary health care,
shelter and basic education. A failure to satisfy these basic needs and minimum
standards for a dignified human existence would prima facie amount to a breach
of the covenant's obligation. An increased justificatory burden would fall on the
state to demonstrate that every effort has been made to mobilise all the
resources at its disposition to satisfy, as a matter of priority, these minimum
obligationa"
The rights in the Covenant are not absolute. The ICESCR contains a
general clause'" prescribing the circumstances under which the state is entitled
32 Essop, F. The Constitutional Enforceability of Socio-Economic Rights with Special Reference
to Housing (1999) LLM Thesis, University of Cape Town at 33.
33 Liebenberg (note 27 above) at 366.
34 Essop (note 33 above) at 41.
35 Article 4 of the Covenant states that:
"The state parties to the present Covenant recognise that, in the enjoyment of those
rights provided by the state in conformity with the present Covenant, the state may
subject such rights only to such limitations as are determined by law only in so far as
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to limit the rights contained in the Covenant. The sole purpose of the limitation
must be the promotion of "the general welfare in a democratic society". Thus
limitations would be permissible to regulate the enjoyment of the various rights,
and to provide for situations where giving unlimited effect to particular rights
would threaten the democratic welfare of the state. Laws that are clear,
accessible and not arbitrary, unreasonable or discriminatory must determine
limitations of the rights." In addition, the state is under a burden to demonstrate
that the particular limitation is necessary and proportionate to its purpose, and
extends only in so far as is compatible with the nature of these rights. A
limitation may not amount to the complete abrogation of the right or introduce
restrictions, which are inconsistent with the overall purpose of the covenant.
Article 5 makes it clear that the conditions under which the rights may
be limited do not extend beyond that specifically provided for in the covenant.
This article also provides that nothing in the covenant may be interpreted as
implying for any state, group or person a right to engage in any activity aimed at
the destruction of the rights or freedoms. This provision is designed to safeguard
the conditions within a state necessary for the full enjoyment of all human
rights.37
The mam source of interpretation of the Covenant is the comments
adopted by the Committee and their records of the state reports. For example, as
far as the right to housing is concerned, it becomes apparent that the right to
adequate housing does not simply entail the provision of a house on demand.
This is a common misconception which exists with respect to the right to
adequate housing, where this right is equated with the immediate duty of the
government to substantively provide a house to anyone who request it to do so.
However, this is not the case, the right of access to adequate housing does not
imply that the state is required to build houses for the entire population, or to
provide housing to all those who request it.38
this may be compatible with the nature of those rights and solely for the purpose of
promoting the general welfare in a democratic society".
36 Craven (note 2 above) at 67.
37 Ibid at 360.
38 Pienaar (note 3 above) at 375.
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The above negative analysis of what the right does not entail will prove
useful when attempting to understand how this particular right can be enforced.
Whilst the state is not generally obliged to provide housing on demand,
international law dictates that there are circumstances, for instance in times of
severe economic constraints, where the states are legally bound to provide
certain vulnerable groups with adequate housing. In so far as the full realisation
of the rights the only method of supervision for these rights is the system of
periodic reporting. The states report to the Committee for Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights39 the extent to which they have complied with their obligations.
The Committee will question the representative of the state party
presenting its report and is prepared to conclude in appropriate cases that the
state is in breach of its obligations under the covenant. The Committee
examines the reports at public meetings to which the reporting state sends
representatives to answer questions and to debate the content of the report with
members of the Committee.
The Committee's recommendations and a summary of the information
received from a state party may be submitted to the General Assembly. The
Committee may also bring matters arising out of the considerations of the
reports to the attention of specialised agencies of the UN such as World Health
Organisation, Food and Agricultural Organisation''' The purpose of this referral
is to enable the appropriate technical assistance to be furnished and to enable
such bodies to advise on international measures likely to contribute to the
effective progressive implementation of the covenant's rights.
The objective of the reporting process includes the undertaking of a
comprehensive review of national legislation, rules and practices combined with
the adoption of strategies and policies to ensure conformity with the obligations
imposed by the covenant. Thus the government will be required to demonstrate
that such principled policy making has in fact been undertaken.
Another important objective of the reporting process is to facilitate
public scrutiny of government policies relating to economic, social and cultural
39 UN body established in 1987 to monitor the compliance of state parties with their obligations
under the Covenant.
40 Craven (note 2 above) at 51.
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rights and to encourage the involvement of civil society in the making and
implementation of the relevant policies. These concluding observations are
unfortunately the beginning and the end of the Committee's powers of
enforcement.
Non-governmental organisations or citizens concerned with the
government's failure to enforce socio-economic rights as per the ICESCR
cannot rely on the international covenant or Committees to have these rights
enforced locally. The reason is that the recommendations do not have binding
force on the states but they can serve as a valuable guide in the effective
realisation of socio-economic rights.
Human rights groups or NGOs can use the carefully reasoned analysis
by the Committee to put pressure on the government to meet their obligations. A
further limitation of these international instruments is that they do not deal with
the question of who within the government is responsible for making decisions
about welfare. More particularly, they do not deal with the question of whether
the courts can force the government to meet its welfare obligations.
Despite the fact that the Committee has a limited enforcement function it
is able to playa valuable role in giving content or meaning to the various socio-
economic rights entrenched in the ICESCR.41 Since its inception the Committee
has been issuing general comments and has dealt with the interpretation of the
various provisions in the covenant. These comments are authoritative statements
by the Committee on the meaning of the rights in the covenant and the nature of
the obligations they impose on the state parties.42
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights responsible for
the monitoring of the ICESCR has adopted" a draft optional protocol permitting
complaints by individuals or groups alleging violations of their rights
recognised in the ICESCR.44 There are also arguments for and against this Draft
Optional Protocol, but I do not intend to dwell on them.45
41 Ibid at 75.
42 Craven (note 2 above) at 77.
43 See Essop (note 33 above).
44 This protocol will obviously be binding only on those states that in addition to having ratified
the ICESCR have also ratified the optional protocol. The protocol has to be adopted by the
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The potentially valuable role of international law in the interpretation of
the rights in the Bill of Rights is explicitly recognised in our Constitution. In
terms of s39 (l)(b) and (c) of the Constitution the courts must consider
international law and may consider foreign law when interpreting the Bill of
Rights. The Constitutional Court has further confirmed that regard may be had
to both binding and non-binding international law."
Therefore the economic, social and cultural rights has been recognised
internationally which encouraged countries such as South Africa to incorporate
the "second generations" rights in their domestic constitutions subject to certain
limitations. The coming into effect of the adopted Optional Protocol to the
covenant allowing individuals, groups and non-governmental organisations to
submit formal complaints of violations to the Committee would both
complement and reinforce the reporting system under the covenant.
South Africa has committed itself at international level to the protection
of human rights. At a regional level, South Africa has ratified the African
Charter on Human and People's Rights and the African Charter on the Rights
and Welfare of the Child. Both these treaties protect a wide range of human
rights including socio-economic rights. South Africa's obligations under both
these treaties are enforced through a reporting procedure and a complaint
system.
The state reporting process is the most common enforcement mechanism for
human rights treaties. It requires a state to submit periodic reports to a
monitoring body on measures it has taken to implement the rights in the specific
human rights instrument. Depending on the instrument, the complaint system
allows individuals to bring complaints against a state party alleging that there
has been a violation of human rights. South Africa has ratified a further five of
the six major treaties protecting human rights. These are:
• the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
United Nations Commission on Human Rights and the Economic and Social Council and the
General Assembly.
45 De Wet E. "Recent Developments Concerning the Draft Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights" (1997) 13 SAJHR 516-517.
46 See (note 4 above) at para 35.
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• the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination;
• the Convention on the elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women;
• the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman Degrading
Treatment or Punishment; and
• the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
The only major international human rights instrument that South Africa has not
yet ratified is the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (lCESCR). The ICESCR is unique in that it is the first international
instrument dedicated exclusively to the protection of socio-economic rights.
Given South Africa's strong constitutional commitment to social justice and
the protection of socio-economic rights, the failure to ratify the ICESCR is
particularly disconcerting. The approval to ratify the ICESCR by the Cabinet
was announced by Minister Kader Asmalon the 23 February 1998. As
mentioned above, a draft optional protocol was adopted by the Committee on
the effective mechanisms for the effective realisation of socio-economic rights.
The fact that South Africa has not yet ratified the covenant gives an impression
that it does not want to be legally bound internationally, in the area relating to
the enforcement of socio-economic rights.
Most of the socio-economic rights included in the South African Bill of
Rights are echoed from those of the covenant. It has ratified other covenants as
mentioned but the question still remains as to why South Africa is so reluctant
to ratify the covenant given the covenants that it has ratified to date. There is an
urgent need for South Africa to ratify the covenant as it has indicated its
intention to ratify by signing the covenant. By doing so it will be incurring an
international obligation not to act contrary to the object and spirit of covenant.
2.3 STATUSOF SOCIO-ECONOMICRIGHTS IN SOUTHAFRICA
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The question of whether socio-economic rights should be constitutionally
protected rights has been the subject of intense debate in both local and
international human rights taw."
Notwithstanding the various arguments against the entrenchment of
socio-economic rights the drafters took a bold step of entrenching these rights
alongside civil and political rights in the Bill of Rights. As mentioned earlier,
South Africa is one of the few countries in the world, which entrenched socio-
economic rights as justiciable rights.
This does not mean that problems such as poverty will be eliminated overnight
but it does establish certain priorities and it should ensure that serious problems
are at least addressed by the government.
The principle of interdependence and indivisibility are clearly manifest
III the Bill of Rights, which does not distinguish between the traditionally
perceived "first generation" rights and "second-generation" rights, except in
their formulation. The manner in which these rights can be enforced is dealt
with in general terms in section 7(2) of the Constitution," which stipulates that
"the state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in Bill of Rights".
In South Africa the state has these various levels of obligations towards
all the rights in the Bill of Rights. In order to understand how socio-economic
rights can be enforced against the state it becomes necessary to understand what
these various levels of obligation entail. The state has an obligation to respect
the autonomy of the individual by not interfering or allowing others
unjustifiable to interfere with the individual's rights, whether they are the civil
and political rights or the socio-economic rights.
This negative dimension, of socio-economic rights requires the state to
protect the individual's right of access to housing, food, health care, social,
security and basic education from any kind of unjustified infringement. Hence
the state is expected to respect the resources owned by the individual or the
47 Davis, D. "The Case Against Inclusion of the Socio-Economic Rights in the Constitution"
(1992) 8 SAJHR 475 at 478-479.
48 South African Constitution Act 108 of 1996.
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group and their right to use the resources in the best possible manner to satisfy
their needs."
In the context of the right of access to housing for example, as
formulated in s 26 (1), this would mean that the Bill of Rights would guarantee
every person the right not to have his or her access to housing be subjected to
interference.
De Vos50 illustrates this by the hypothetical example of a provincial
government that, in the preparation for a visit by members of the International
Olympic Committee, decides to bulldoze a cluster of informal houses that have
been erected on an open piece of land near the airport. By acting in such a
manner, the government is failing to respect the informal settler's right to access
housing.
However it is also important to note that the drafters of the constitution
took great care to frame the rights in such a way as not to place an absolute and
unambiguous obligation on the government to fulfil them. The provisions in the
Constitution recognises everyone's right to have "access" to the right as
opposed to "have" a right. The inclusion of the word "access" could be
criticised as it renders the meaning of the provisions vague and ambiguous.
However, the distinction could also be understood as an attempt to avoid
an interpretation that the section creates an unqualified obligation on the state. It
must not be interpreted to guarantee a right on demand to everyone, which
would amount to an unrealistic interpretation of the right. This formulation
serves to limit the obligations of the state.
This shows that a clear understanding of the right in question is
essential. When attempting to enforce the right of access to adequate housing it
becomes essential to understand what the core content of the right entails. The
term "access" to housing for example, has been defined" to mean access by the
individual to the following: privacy, space, security, lighting, ventilation,
adequate basic infrastructure and adequate location with regard to work and
basic facilities all at a reasonable cost.
49 Craven (note 2 above) at 37
50 De Vos, P. "Pious Wishes or Directly Enforceable Human Rights" (1997) 13 SAJHR 13 at 80.
51 Essop (note 33 above) at 39.
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This interpretation is further elaborated by the Committee on Socio-
Economic Rights which asserts that the core entitlement of the right to adequate
housing comprises the following components: legal security of tenure,
availability of services, materials, facilities and infrastructure, location,
habitability, affordability, accessibility and cultural adequacy. This provides a
useful guideline as to what the content of this right entail, which belie the
argument that socio-economic rights are vague and imprecise.
South Africa has adopted a number of legislative and other measures in
an attempt to realise the right to adequate housing. The Housing Act52is the
legislative framework that complies with the requirement as set out in section
26(2). The Act does not provide any clear definition of the term "housing" but
instead refers to the term "housing development" which is defined as:
"The establishment and maintenance of habitable, stable and sustainable
public and private residential environment to ensure viable households
and communities in areas allowing convenient access to economic
opportunities, and to health, educational and social amenities in which
all citizens and permanent residents of the Republic will, on a
progressive basis, have access to:
• permanent residential structures with secure tenure, ensuring
internal and external privacy and providing adequate protection
against the elements and
• potable water, adequate sanitary facilities and domestic energy
supply".53
Apart from enacting legislation to promote the right to housing, the government
has also introduced a National Housing Subsidy Scheme as one of the means to
adhere to its obligation to fulfil the right of access to adequate housing. All
subsidies are paid out of the National Housing Fund in order to allow a
qualifying beneficiary to acquire a residential property with secure tenure at a
price that is affordable.
The state's duty to respect and protect the individual's right against
infringement is provided for in section 26(3) that protects an individual against
eviction or demolition of a person's home without an order of the court.
52 The Housing Act 107 of 1997.
53 Pienaar (note 3 above) at 389.
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The court has to consider all the relevant circumstances before granting
an order of eviction or demolition. According to international law relevant
circumstances would include personal circumstances of those being deprived of
accommodation. Furthermore, any provision in legislation that allows evictions
or demolitions without an order of the court will be unconstitutional. This sub-
section binds not only the state authorities but also natural and juristic persons.
Section 8(2) of the South African Constitution provides as follows:
"A provision of the Bill of Rights binds natural or juristic person if, and
to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the
right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right."
The nature of section 26(3) is that it imposes a negative obligation not to
arbitrarily evict without an order of the court and can therefore be applicable to
all landlords who have the power to evict, be it the state, a natural or a juristic
person. Specific legislation was introduced to give effect to s 26(3) of the
constitution in the form of the Prevention of Illegal Evictions from and
Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998, which aims to regulate evictions
from occupation of land.
As for the requirement that the court has to consider all the relevant
circumstances before issuing an order of eviction, in Uitenhage Local
Transitional Council v Zenza, 54 the court granted an application for the eviction
of squatters who had illegally occupied land belonging to the Council. It was
held that on consideration of all the relevant circumstances, s 26(3) did not
protect the squatters from eviction. The squatters had ignored the Council's
right of ownership and they had not co-operated with the council's efforts to
resolve the situation by finding an alternative land for them to settle on.
The impact of s 26(3) on the common law relating to eviction was
considered in Ross v South Peninsula Municipality." The allegations failed to
place all the relevant circumstances justifying the eviction before the court as
required by s 26(3). The Act56 requires the court to consider the rights and the
needs of certain vulnerable groups in society.
54 1997 (8) BCLR 1115 (SE).
552000 (1) SA 589 (C).
56 Prevention of Illegal Evictions from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998.
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The state has to ensure that the individual's rights are protected against
infringement by the state or private actors. The state is therefore under an
obligation to prevent the infringements of the rights through the adoption of
legislation and other measures, the legislation then being subject to judicial
review. The right therefore does not require the state to deliver a commodity to
the individual in the generally understood sense but rather expects the state to
create amongst other measures a legislative framework in which the individuals
will be able to realise their protected rights without interference from others.
The next layer of obligation requires the state to promote socio-
economic rights whereby it has a positive duty to create conditions or an
environment in which these rights could be realised by the individual. At this
level the individual can expect more positive assistance from the state, but it still
falls short of the state actually providing a commodity to the individual. Instead
the state is expected to create an environment conducive to these rights being
realised.
In the case of the right to food under the ICESCR the state is required to
take measures to improve the production, conservation and distribution of food.
The state has to make full use of technical and scientific knowledge of the
principles of nutrition and by developing systems so as to achieve the most
efficient development and utilisation of natural resources. 57
The last level of obligation, which is the duty of the state to promote and
fulfil socio-economic rights, is the most interventionist and costly level of
obligation imposed on the state. It could be required to deliver on a commodity
and it may for instance have to make provision for people's most basic needs.
With regard to the right to have access to housing states are encouraged to take
steps to ensure that housing related costs are commensurate of with income
levels.
Asbjom Eide gave some indication in his recommendations of what shape
the obligations to promote and fulfil could take in the context of the right to
food. He recommended that states have to:
57 See Article 11(2) of the ICESCR, 1966.
30
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
• establish a nation wide system of identifying local needs and
opportunities for achieving food security.
• draw up plans for national food security, focusing on housing and
community food security.
• identify as a matter of priority the needs of groups, which have the
greatest difficulty in achieving food security and set specific objectives
for achieving sustainable access to adequate food.
• determine the areas in which international assistance is required and
detail the requirements.
• ensure that an adequate monitoring system for the right to food IS
developed and put in action."
These recommendations can be used to conceptualise more clearly what the
right to adequate food would entail and the specific state obligations, which it
generates. Needless to say, at the level of promoting and fulfilling socio-
economic rights the state duties are less clearly defined and enforcing these
rights against the state becomes more complex as courts are likely to show
greater deference to the legislative and executive branches of government where
the allocation of resources are required for the realisation of the socio-economic
rights.
Despite the difficulties, which may arise with the state obligation, the above
model of layers of obligations provides the states with very helpful guidelines
on the issue of enforcing socio-economic rights. Apart from using the levels of
obligations'Ïto enforce socio-economic rights the courts will further be able to
use the traditional civil and political rights in the Constitution to enforce socio-
economic rights to give effect to the interdependence principle. Hence the
provision on equality'" and human dignity'i'could both be used to enforce socio-
economic rights, an argument can be easily made out that being deprived of a
58 Eide (note 20 above) at 90.
59 Section 7(2).
60 See section 9 which states that:
(2) Equality includes full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote ...
by unfair discrimination.
61 See section 10 stating that: 'Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity
respected and promoted' .
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socio-economic right amounts to a direct infringement of one's human dignity
as well as the right to equality. Those who are denied access to the basic
necessities for an adequate standard of living will not enjoy the enjoyment of
the civil and political rights.
In the Indian jurisprudence the Supreme Court in, Olga Tellis and Others v
Bombay Municipal Corporatton" tried to enforce the socio-economic right to
adequate housing by inextricably linking this right to the fundamental right to
life.63 The court emphasized the wide ambit of the right to life and said that an
equally important facet of the right to life is the right to livelihood because no
person can live without the means of living. While the state may not be
compelled to provide adequate means of livelihood except according to just and
fair procedures established by law, can challenge the deprivation as offending
the right to life.64
Another civil and political right that could be used to enforce SOCIO-
economic rights indirectly is the right to just administrative action as set out in
section 33(1) of the Constitution. Individuals should be able to challenge
administrative action that for instance, results in unfair or discriminatory
allocation of housing subsidies.
Apart from using these "first generations" rights nothing precludes one
from using the existing common law or legislative remedies to obtain redress.
On the question of who these rights can be enforced against, section 7(2) of the
Constitution states that the state has various levels of obligations towards the
rights in the Bill of Rights. The provision in the Constitution dealing with the
application of the Bill of Rights provides that "the Bill of Rights applies to all
law and binds the legislature, executive judiciary and all organs of state". 65
It is necessary to clarify exactly who is responsible for meeting these
obligations as it is possible that local government authorities may attempt to
abdicate their responsibility in this regard on the basis that housing for instance
does not fall within their functional competence.
62 (1985) 3 sec 545.
63 For a more detailed discussion and critique of the case see De Vos (note 52) at 82.
64 See (note 54 above) at para 369 (B-C).
65 Section 8 (1).
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This demonstrates that interaction between state and people takes place at
the level of the local government. Furthermore, in the light of the fact that the
greatest interaction between the government and the people takes place at the
level of the local government, especially in relation to people's basic socio-
economic needs, it is imperative that those local authorities understand what
their obligations are."
Therefore, the objective of the local government under the Constitution is to
provide services to the communities in a sustainable manner, promoting social
and economic development and promoting a safe and healthy environment.
On the issue of who may enforce these rights, the constitution has a broad
and progressive locus standi provision allowing for class actions. It allows
anyone acting in the public interest to approach the courts for relief or a
declaration of rights, where they allege that a right has been threatened or
infringed+'
Hence NGOs will be able to take socio-economic issues to court on behalf
of or in the interest of indigent groups of people especially where the group is
experiencing financial constraints and are unable to secure legal assistance or
fearing an adverse costs order. The various methods of enforcing socio-
economic rights as shown above, enforcement would most likely take place
through the courts of which their role will be explained in Chapter Four.
The Constitution does provide for an alternative institution where one could
lodge complaints about the state's failure to enforce socio-economic rights,
namely the HRC whose role will be discussed in Chapter Three. Therefore, the
courts in collaboration with the HRC and NGOs will contribute a lot to improve
and enhance the betterment of the lives of all human beings.
2.4 ADVANCING SOCIO-ECONOMICRIGHTS
The previous sections dealt with status of socio-economic rights both
internationally and locally. Despite the entrenchment of these rights in the
66 Pillay, K. "The Role of the Local Government in Implementing the Right of Access to
Adequate Housing" (1998) 1ESR Review at 12.
67 Section 38.
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ICESCR and the South African Constitution, measures for more effective
mechanisms for the realisation of these rights have been put in place. The
purpose in this section is to examine the effectiveness of those measures that
have been adopted towards the effective realisation of the socio-economic
rights.
In ensunng the effective realisation of socio-economic rights the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has adopted a Draft
Optional Protocol in December 1996. As highlighted this protocol will be
entirely non-compulsory in that it will bind only those states that have ratified it.
This is the international practice that the states must adhere to. There are
reservations about the effectiveness of this protocol considering the reluctance
of countries such as South Africa to ratify the ICESCR.
In line with international practice South Africa has passed two acts,
which will serve as the basis for the protection of socio-economic rights.
2.4.1 The Promotion of Access to Information Act No.2 of 2000
The coming into effect of the Act will provide a mechanism for accessing
information and addressing situations like these. This Act has been drafted in
terms of section 32(2) of the Constitution that mandates the passage of this
legislation to give access to information."
The Act aims to provide a coherent legislative framework for the right of
access to information held by public bodies, and by private individuals that is
necessary for the protection of the rights. For a country emerging from a history
of authoritarian secrecy exercised by both the state and the private sector, the
culture of openness and accountability envisaged by this Act is likely to
revolutionalise the treatment and management of information in South Africa.
While the impact of the Act will permeate many sectors, it has the
potential to have a particularly profound effect on socio-economic rights of the
disadvantaged groups and individuals. Information held by private bodies is
68 Section 32(2) states that:
National legislation must be enacted to give effect to this right, and may provide for
reasonable measures to alleviate the administrative and financial burden on the state.
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subject to the procedural requirements set out in the Act and must be necessary
for the protection or the exercise of a right. This Act echoes the constitutional
provisions on standing in terms of section 38. An individual, the community or
a group of people can exercise the right of access to information. It is also
possible for interventions to be made on behalf of vulnerable communities.
The inclusion of the state is likely to enhance the protection of the socio-
economic rights. It effectively enables the state to intervene on behalf of
vulnerable communities by requesting the information from powerful private
bodies. This role will be particularly important in protecting socio-economic
rights against improper invasion from other private bodies.
For example, the state can request information from a manufacturing
company in order to determine the effects of pollution on a local community
caused by the company's activities. The intervention may be necessary to
protect the right to a clean environment. The information gathered can be used
to advance the socio-economic rights of the disadvantaged communities and is
therefore a tool for the state by which to fulfil its constitutional obligations.
The courts also have been given an opportunity to widen its scope of
enquiry in respect of socio-economic rights through additional information that
can now be accessed. In addition, the courts will be able to develop innovative
remedies for the enforcement of these rights.
The information can be withheld if it is going to encroach upon: 69
• mandatory protection of privacy of a third part who is a natural person;
• protection of commercial information of a third party;
• protection of confidential information of a third party; and
• mandatory protection of safety of individuals and protection of property.
This one shows that despite withholding the information as envisaged in the
Act, it will not prejudice the disadvantaged people of our country. These
provisions are unlikely to jeopardise the Act's role in advancing socio-economic
rights because they are subject to the general public interest override. In other
words, even information that falls within the ambit of an exemption and is
35
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therefore prima facie protected, but must be disclosed if the public interest
warrants it.
The Act empowers civil society to participate meaningfully in the measures
adopted by the government towards the realisation of socio-economic rights. It
can contribute to improve the quality of people's lives through being used to
access information from the government and private bodies relating to the
protection and advancement of socio-economic rights. For example, it can play
a particularly useful role in accessing information relating to budget
management and priorities. If this information indicates a disproportionately
low spending on socio-economic rights, it may be used to challenge government
spending. It therefore, empowers the public and individuals with an important
tool to monitor state spending priorities.
The enforcement procedures of the Act are problematic. Firstly, reviews of
internal decisions that refuse access to records must be made to the High Court.
The High Court is an inaccessible, expensive, slow and adversarial forum. It
therefore poses a barrier to ordinary people using the Act to enforce socio-
economic rights.
Furthermore, High Court turf is the lawyer's terrain that is a further barrier
to the poor and the disadvantaged individuals and groups. The power given to
the state to request information on behalf of vulnerable and poor communities is
therefore particularly important.
Secondly, the internal procedures are only intended to facilitate access to
information. It does not have a bearing on socio-economic rights but it can be
used to advance the protection of socio-economic rights. Once accessed, the
information must still be interpreted and analysed. The interpretation and
analysis of complex information is often beyond the scope of the expertise of
ordinary people and requires specialised services.
Despite this shortcoming, the culture of openness and accountable
governance envisaged by the Act will promote the realisation of socio-economic
rights. The prescriptive measures adopted in the Act will ensure that it is
accessible, easy to comprehend and beneficial to the general public. In short, it
69 Part 2 and 3 of Chapter 4 of the Act.
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will empower the public to participate meaningfully in the affairs of the
government and to influence the protection and advancement of socio-economic
rights.
Therefore, irrespective of the difficulties, the Act will promote the
realisation of socio-economic rights. As the Act is aimed at breaking the culture
of secrecy and strives for openness and accountability it is therefore likely to
revolutionalise the treatment and management of information in South Africa.
2.4.2 The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination
Act No 4 of 2000
The second Act that has been put into place was passed in February 2000.
Because of the deep structural inequalities in our society the Act will take effect
in that context.
Income inequalities are likely to remain a key feature of the South African
society because of the trends towards the more skilled labour, job shedding in
the formal economy and the low employment capacity of the economy.
Unemployment, the lack of access to productive resources such as land, social
services such as water, health care and education have increased the
vulnerability of many households. The President of the Constitutional Court has
said that:
" ... the socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights represent a
commitment addressing conditions of poverty and inequalities III our
society"."
The right to equality in our Bill of Rights includes the full and equal enjoyment
of all rights and freedoms. This implies that vulnerable and disadvantaged
groups should not experience unfair discrimination in accessing and enjoying
their constitutionally protected rights, including socio-economic rights. It is
clear therefore that the Act is committed to a vision of equality that seeks to
redress systemic, socio-economic inequalities. It is far reaching in its
application, binding both the state and all private parties.
70 Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal1997 (12) BCLR 1696 at paras 8 and 9.
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The two Acts taken together have the potential to be a powerful tool to
protect disadvantaged groups from unfair discrimination in accessing and
enjoying socio-economic rights.
2.5 LIMITATIONOF SOCIO-ECONOMICRIGHTS
This section examines the extent to which the state can limit the rights
guaranteed in the Constitution. Despite the general limitation clause, a
discussion on the nature of the internally qualified rights in respect of socio-
economic rights will be made. All the rights in the Bill of Rights including the
socio-economic rights can be limited or restricted by a law of general
application. The section dealing with the limitation" of rights sets out the
conditions for a valid limitation of a right.
The limitation must be under a law of general application. In other words,
the law must not target named or easily identifiable individuals or groups and it
must not be arbitrary. The limitation must be reasonable and justifiable in an
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.r' A
court will look at the number of factors to decide if a limitation of a right is
justifiable and reasonable including:
• the reason why the right is being limited;
• the degree to which the right is being limited;
• whether there are other less restrictive ways to achieve the limitation
meaning that the right should be limited no more than is necessary to
achieve the purpose of the limitation. The government has to prove that
a limitation is reasonable and justifiable.
Apart from being subjected to the general limitation clause, most of the socio-
economic rights except for children's rights, the right to an environment that is
not harmful to health and well being;" the right against arbitrary evictions or
demolitions." the right against refusal of emergency treatment," the right to
71 Section 36.
72 Liebenberg, S. and Pillay K. Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa (2000) at 35.
73 Section 24(a).
74 Section 26(3).
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basic education'fand the socio-economic rights of people in pnson or III
detention." were formulated with their own internal limitations.
The unqualified rights will be easier to enforce in the courts than the
qualified rights. The government will not be able to argue that it has not fulfilled
these rights because it needs more time or has limited resources. Rather the
government will have to argue that it has reasonably and justifiably limited
these rights under the general limitation clause in the Bill of Rights.
In terms of these internal limitations everyone has the right to have "access"
to adequate housing, health care, food, water and social security and the state is
required to take "reasonable legislative and other measures" within its available
resources to achieve the progressive realisation of these rights. The
constitutional drafters have obviously included these rights in recognition of the
difficulties that may arise when challenging the state's lack of promoting or
fulfilling these socio-economic rights in courts.
These limitations provide the state with some form of defence against a
potential claimant's demand for an immediate delivery of a socio-economic
entitlement. By including the word "access" one automatically limits the
obligation of the state and does not require the state to provide one of the above
resources directly at no cost to the individual.
The government's role in accessing socio-economic rights is to create an
"enabling environment", which makes it possible for people to gain access to
these rights and improve their quality of life. In addition, it has to remove
barriers in the way of people gaining access to these rights and lastly, to adopt
special measures to assist vulnerable and disadvantaged groups to gain access to
the rights.
Socio-economic rights therefore, do not mean that people do not have to pay
school fees, service charges and other user fees. However, these charges should
not be a barrier that prevents poor people from gaining access to education,
water services, health care and other rights. Charges for basic services should be
affordable to poor people. People who genuinely cannot afford service charges
75 Section 27(3).
76 Section 29(1)(a).
77 Section 35(2)(e).
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should be able to talk to the relevant authority for a reduction or other
concession. Government must fulfil its duties, but groups and communities are
also responsible for participating actively in their own development. As
Liebenberg notes, people are "active participants and beneficiaries" of the right
to development not "passive recipients't."
As far as the phrase "reasonable legislative and other measures't" is
concerned it has been recognised internationally and locally that the adoption of
legislative measures alone will not suffice. Other measures, which would also
be considered appropriate, would include administrative, financial, educational
and social measures.
The state should further be seen to be adopting and implementing
comprehensive policies and plans relating to these rights whilst at the same time
providing for appropriate judicial remedies to enable the rights to be enforced in
courts. The key to the justiciability of socio-economic rights in the Constitution
is the standard of reasonableness.
The courts can evaluate the reasonable measures adopted by the state. The
precise contours and content of the measures to be adopted are primarily a
matter for the legislature and the executive. In any challenge based on section
26 in which it is argued that the state has failed to meet the positive obligations
imposed upon it by section 26(2), the question will be whether the legislative
and other measures taken by the state are reasonable. Once it is shown that the
measures are reasonable, this requirement is met. 80 Given that both the
legislative and other measures must be taken, reasonableness can be evaluated
both at the level of the legislative programme and its implementation.
The state is obliged to act in order to achieve the intended results and the
legislative measures will invariably have to be supported by appropriate, well-
directed policies and programmes implemented by the executive. These policies
must be reasonable both in their conception and their implementation. An
otherwise reasonable programme that is not implemented reasonably will not
78 Liebenberg (note 74 above) at 27.
79 Sections 25(5), 26(2) and 27(2).
80 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2000 (lI)
BCLR 1169 (CC) para 41.
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constitute compliance with the state's obligation." This means that courts can
require an explanation from the state of the measures chosen to fulfil its duties
to realise socio-economic rights. The state can be required to give an account of
its progress in implementing these measures.
While there can be disagreements about the best way to achieve those goals,
the state has an obligation to justify its choice of means to the public. The
explanation can be evaluated for its reasonableness and its ability to convince a
reasonable person of its coherence.
The obligation of justification means the provision of reasons would satisfy
most people of the rationality of a policy on its own terms, even if they were not
convinced about the wisdom of choosing such a policy. The court will be able to
make an order finding that there has been a violation by the state of an
individual's socio-economic rights because the state's programme to fulfil the
right is not reasonable.
Despite the centrality of the reasonableness standard to the court's treatment
of socio-economic rights, the court does not define the standard at all. Instead it
emphasises that the enquiry into reasonableness must be conducted in
accordance with the merits of each case. A characteristic of a legal standard is
that considerable interpretative discretion is given to the adjudicator responsible
for its application and that it therefore does not specify an outcome in advance.f
The standard of reasonableness becomes more bound as courts develop
guidelines and set of factors with a bearing on future applications. The plight of
the Grootboom applicants was decided as follows:
" ... the root of the cause of their problems is the intolerable conditions
under which they were living while waiting in the queue for their turn to
be allocated low-cost housing't."
The state had in place legislation and policy measures designed to provide for
alleviation over time of housing shortages by providing access to permanent,
durable residential structures with secure tenure rights. What was lacking was a
81 Ibid at para 42.
82 De Waal, J. et al (eds) The Bill of Rights Handbook 4ed (2000) at 437.
83 Grootboom (note 82 above) at para 44.
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provision for temporary relief to people in an emergency.l" The legislation has
overlooked those in an emergency, an omission that was unreasonable,
additionally because it was in conflict with the constitutional obligations to
respect human dignity and the right to equality. Reasonableness must be
understood in the context of the Bill of Rights as a whole.
The right of access to housing is entrenched because human beings are
valued and to ensure that they are afforded their basic needs. Reasonableness
requires the design, adoption and implementation of measures to realise socio-
economic rights that do not exclude those most in need of the protection of these
rights. Reasonable measures were therefore not in place at the initial application
for constitutional relief in Grootboom and the state was held to be in violation of
its obligation under section 26(2).
The provision of "progressive realisation" allows the state a further
justification in delaying the full realisation of the right. However it does not
mean that the state may defer its obligations to some distant undetermined time
in the future, it simply amounts to a recognition that the full realisation of socio-
economic rights will generally not be able to be achieved in a short period of
time. The state has an obligation to move as expeditiously and effectively as
possible towards the realisation of these rights and any undue delay or deliberate
retrogressive measures would constitute an infringement of the relevant right in
question.
The phrase "within its available resources" could further be used to
rationalise the failure of government to meet its obligations with respect to these
rights. It is argued that available resources do not depend solely on the gross
national product of the society concerned, but also on the amount of resources
being made available to the state for the pursuit of its obligations under the
constitution as well as international human rights law.
It has also been argued that "available resources" refer to the resources
of the country and not to the budgetary appropriateness, which would mean
courts may probe beyond government allocations as reflected in the national
budget and may take account of the country's "real" resources. It is assumed
84 Ibid at para 52.
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that the "real" resources of the country would be the natural resources, including
state land or mineral resources as well as existing intellectual capital and levels
of skills in the country which could all be used in the realisation of socio-
economic rights.
Thus if for example only 5% of the budget is allocated to housing, and
the state claims lack of resources (Soobramoney case) should the courts not then
be allowed to scrutinise for instance what available state land could be used or
sold for the building of more houses? A further question in relation to available
resources concerns the choices made by the state in its allocation of its budget,
for instance what resources have been allocated to the realisation of socio-
economic rights compared to other purposes? Where available resources are
demonstrably inadequate, the state must still strive to ensure the widest possible
enjoyment of the relevant right under the prevailing circumstances.
It is interesting to note that children's socio-economic rights are not
subject to the same limitation of available resources and progressive realisation
as other socio-economic rights. Children are considered as vulnerable members
of the society and are therefore entitled to special protection of their basic
subsistence needs. Hence parents could use the rights (Grootboom ) of their
children to achieve socio-economic rights for themselves, as they would be free
of the internal limitations attached to other socio-economic rights. Despite the
fact that these rights will not be subject to any internal limitations, children's
right provision like every right in the constitution is subject to the general
limitation provision.f
2.6 CONCLUSION
Having discussed the status of socio-economic rights internationally as well as
within the South African context it becomes apparent that constitutionalising
these rights is not without problems. Measures have been adopted
internationally and locally for the effective realisation of these rights so that
they do not become paper rights. Internationally every democracy is unique and
has its own defining qualities.
85 Section 36.
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In South Africa, despite entrenching the socio-economic rights in the
constitution and their justiciability, other legislation'" have been passed to
ensure commitment to the realisation of the socio-economic needs. In South
Africa breaking the culture of secrecy, empowering people with information by
providing written reasons for the decisions that affect their lives is crucial to the
consolidation of our democracy. Building and transforming broken lives
requires the active participation of affected communities. Access to information
is likely to foster greater accountability and result in better-informed decisions.
These Acts'" will be effective tools to prevent and promote substantive
equality if the courts are accessible and user friendly to disadvantaged groups. If
sufficient resources are allocated for the effective implementation of these Acts,
that alone will be a step forward towards more stringent mechanisms for the
effective realisation of these rights.
Internationally, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights has adopted the Draft Optional Protocol as one of the effective ways of
putting more stringent mechanisms for the protection and the preservation of the
socio-economic needs. But as mentioned there are reservations about the
effectiveness of this Protocol. It is non-compulsory and the states have to ratify
it like any other international treaty. It is important to take note of the fact that
the Constitutional Drafters took great care to frame the rights in such a way as
not to place an absolute and unambiguous obligation on the government to fulfil
them.
Despite, South Africa's commitment to the protection of human rights
internationally and locally, it still has failed to ratify the ICESCR. South
Africa's failure to ratify the ICESCR undermines its commitment to economic
and social rights before the international community. Judging from the
international instruments South Africa has ratified to date, it seems that more
emphasis is placed on civil and political rights than on socio-economic rights.
Support for this contention lies in our ratification of the ICCPR, but our ongoing
reluctance to ratify the ICESCR.
86 Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act No 4 of 2000 and
Promotion of Access to Information Act No 2 of 2000.
87 Ibid.
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Commitment to the ICESCR is an ideal opportunity to reiterate our
commitment to alleviating poverty and ensuring social justice for all.
Ratification of the ICESCR will clearly indicate our commitment to the plight of
South Africa's poor and development opportunities for all.
Equal status has been accorded to "first and second generations" rights,
but it is still clear that to reclaim the space of socio-economic rights is still a
challenging task. Therefore, the measures adopted for the effective realisation of
these rights must not only be taken but must be seen to be taken.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE MONITORING FUNCTION
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The real test for a commitment to human rights norms lies in the mechanisms
that are in place for their enforcement. In order to ensure that socio-economic
rights do not end up as mere paper rights, the progress made in realising these
rights will have to be closely monitored. Monitoring must be designed to give a
detailed overview of the existing situation. The principal value of such an
overview is to enable people to determine how the government has performed in
respect of the implementation of socio-economic rights.
The new South African Constitution I places a unique emphasis on socio-
economic rights, both through the legally binding/ or " hard" protection of these
rights by the courts, and the non-legally binding or "soft" protection offered by
non-judicial institutions such the South African Human Rights Commission'
(SAHRC) and Non-governmental Organisations (NGOS).4 It is not exclusively
or primarily through the courts that the rights are to be realised. In order to
support the limited justiciability of socio-economic rights the new Constitution
introduced an additional soft mechanism for their protection. The decisions of
the Commission are not binding enforcement mechanisms such as the decisions
of the courts. Instead, the Constitution obliges relevant organs of the state to
report regularly to the Commission on the measures they have taken towards
realising these rights and requires the Commission to exercise a monitoring
function in this regard.
The role of the Commission IS described in section 184(3) of the
Constitution:
1 Act 108 of 1996.
2 Section 172 (1) (b) and see, also, De Vos, Pierre "Pious Wishes or Directly Enforceable
Human Rights? Social and Economic Rights in South Africa's 1996 Constitution" (1997) 13
SAJHR at 67, on the judicial protection of socio-economic rights under the new Constitution.
3 Section 184 (3) (Hereinafter referred to as the "Commission").
4 Section 38 (Hereinafter referred to as ''NGOs'').
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"Each year the HRC must require relevant organs of the state to provide
the Commission with information on the measures they have taken
towards the realisation of the rights in Bill of Rights concerning housing,
health care, food, water, social security, education and the environment."
The Commission clearly has a special constitutional obligation to monitor the
realisation of the rights enshrined in the Constitution. In executing this mandate
the Commission has no direct precedent to follow in the legal systems of other
countries. The closest analogy would be with the reporting procedures on socio-
economic rights under international instruments, whereby states are required, at
regular intervals, to provide information on the realisation of certain socio-
economic rights in their jurisdictions to the relevant treaty monitoring bodies.
The section 184(3) procedure captures the essential spirit of the
international reporting procedure. It introduces the procedure on the domestic
level, by placing an obligation on the state to justify itself to a domestic body in
respect of socio-economic rights. By imposing an obligation to justify, it
ensures that organs of state will keep the realisation of socio-economic rights on
their agendas. More than that, monitoring should galvanise the organs of the
state by exposing shortcomings and highlighting the government's successes in
the implementation of socio-economic rights. Through the introduction of
domestic reporting and monitoring procedure the "soft" protection of socio-
economic rights in the constitution consequently has the potential to be more
significant than one would have thought.
In this Chapter I highlight the mechanisms that have been put in place to
ensure the effective monitoring in respect of socio-economic rights both locally
and internationally. That will help to determine whether our own system is on
par with the international one. I do not mean to imply that the international
system should be emulated at the domestic level. Itmayor may not be suitable.
Instead, the objective is to use the system as a point of reference for the
development of a uniquely South African domestic system. The manner in
which the Commission has dealt with its constitutional mandate will also be
examined. I will further argue that NGOs should be more actively involved in
the process of monitoring socio-economic rights.
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Therefore, considering the scarcity of jurisprudence in relation to socio-
economic rights, the reference to the international system of monitoring will be
of great value to the effective implementation of these rights domestically.
3.2 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM OF MONITORING
This section examines the international reporting and the petition procedure in
respect of socio-economic rights. The reason is that it may serve as a guide to
the local domestic system of monitoring. Since the closest analogy to the
domestic reporting procedure is the international practice in this regard it is
useful to analyse the role of the reporting and the petition procedures under
international law. In addition, I discuss how the international reporting system
can benefit the domestic reporting procedure.
The institution of the international supervisory mechanisms through the
creation of human rights committees has become one form of effecting
compliance with the human rights treaty obligations. The main function of such
bodies is to ensure compliance with the relevant treaty obligations. The
monitoring body has to clarify and develop standards that are to be implemented
for the effective realisation of socio-economic rights. It also has to assess the
degree to which the states are actively acting in conformity with their
obligations. Lastly, it has to recommend either remedial or preventive action to
ensure compliance with the relevant treaty.'
The monitoring bodies playa constructive role in assessing the situation
and to give advice to countries as to possible remedial actions. The procedure
requires a certain amount of co-operation from the states that might not be
forthcoming if it were thought that the burdens of participation outweighed the
benefits. As far as benefits are concerned, the importance of the promotional
aspects of implementation should not be underestimated."
5 VanDijk, P. et al (eds) Restructuring the International Economic Order: The Role of Lawyers
(1996) 135 at 144.
6 Cohn C. "The Early Harvest: Domestic Legal Changes Related to the Human Rights
Committee and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" (1991) 13 Human
Rights Quarterly 95 at 97.
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The international body responsible for monitoring compliance with the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (lCESCR) is
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. It has been charged
with the difficult task of ensuring that states comply with their international
obligations under the covenant. This monitoring body is composed of eighteen
experts serving in their personal capacities. The Council elects them by secret
ballot from a list nominated by state parties to the ICESCR. Furthermore,
special consideration is given to equitable geographical distribution and to the
representation of different forms of social and legal systems.'
Monitoring on the international plane draws on the reporting and the
petition systems that I will discuss below. Each of these forms has a theoretical
and practical basis.
3.2.1 Reporting Obligation
Reporting obligations is often used as an enforcement mechanism of human
rights norms on the international level.8 A whole range of United Nations and
regional human rights conventions require state parties on a regular basis to give
account to international supervisory bodies created for this purpose, of all the
steps they have taken to meet the obligations they assumed by becoming parties
to the conventions."
According to the Committee'" the reporting process has a number of
objectives, namely, the state concerned should undertake to monitor and
evaluate its own performance by conducting a thorough review of the degree to
which the rights are enjoyed by all sections of the community. In doing so, it
should stimulate public scrutiny of government policy in the areas concerned
and pinpoint difficulties and shortcomings in existing arrangements. Promotion
of human rights is often the first and the necessary stage leading to the
protection of rights. In short, it promotes the protection of human rights.
7 Bayat, N. "A Comparative Overview of Reporting on Socio-Economic Rights Under
International Human Rights Law Report" (1997) Socio-Economic Rights Project, Centre for
Human Rights, University of Pretoria at 2.
8 Heyns C. "Taking Socio-Economic Rights Seriously: The Domestic Reporting Procedure and
the Role of the South African Human Rights Commission" (1997) 30 De Jure 195 at 205.
9lbid at 197.
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The most important UN instrument that employs this mechanism in
respect of socio-economic rights is the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights. Il Several other international human rights
instruments enunciate socio-economic rights in respect of certain vulnerable
groups and pose corresponding reporting obligations. They include the
International Convention on the Elimination on All Forms of Racial
Discrimination.V the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women 13 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.14
South Africa has ratified the African Charter and other UN instruments
including those listed above except for the ICESCR. The latter is in the process
of being ratified. It has been signed. Ratification will mean that the country will
be subjected to reporting obligations in respect of socio-economic rights on
three distinct levels. Most important will be the ICESCR, which requires an
initial report after two and thereafter a report every five years. On the regional
level the country is required to report to the African Commission on Human and
People's Rights every two years. On the domestic level these international
obligations will be supplemented by the internal reporting procedure created by
section 184(3) that requires yearly reports.
As I have stated above, reporting requires the state to submit periodic
reports on the domestic implementation of the treaty rights. Generally, the
reports are considered by the supervisory body, which reviews them and makes
recommendations. It is dependent to a large extent on the good faith of the states
concerned. The international bodies are reliant upon the provision of accurate
and relevant information by the states and the monitoring body is mandated
purely with the function of assisting and advising states. Reporting is therefore
considered as a mechanism for fact-finding and more specifically the
verification or the promotion of human rights in contrast to the protective
function of a petition system.
10 General Comment No 1 (1989) at 12.
Il It was adopted on 16 December 1966, see Eide, A. et al (eds) Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (1995) at 15 and Chapman, A "A Violations Approach for Monitoring the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" (1996) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 21 at
23.
12 Adopted 1965 and entered into force in January 1969.
13 Adopted 1979 and entered into force in 1981.
14 Adopted 1989 and entered into force in 1990.
50
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
3.2.2 Petition System
The petition system is regarded to be a more effective means for the protection
of human rights. IS It involves the receipt of communications from individuals or
state parties alleging violations of the treaty concerned. As regards the
individual complaint system, which is generally optional for state parties, the
procedure is intended to provide the victim of the violation with an international
remedy where a domestic remedy is not available. Although the international
body may not necessarily have the power to enforce its decision, this does not
always detract from the efficacy of the system.
The petition procedure is not without problems. While the petition
procedure allows for an in-depth analysis of particular situations, it cannot
compete with the breadth and scale of action that takes place under the various
reporting mechanisms. It has been noted that even in those cases where petition
systems are operative, the reporting system has formed the mainstay of
supervision by providing continuous monitoring. This is partly due to the fact
that fewer states have agreed to be bound by the petition system. Equally
important, the complicated procedures for the receipt and consideration of
complaints mean that they are not always readily accessible to the
disadvantaged who might be victims of violations.l"
Both the reporting and petition systems depend upon the force of
national and international pressure for their effectiveness. Petition procedures
are generally accompanied by greater public interests and therefore could said to
be more effective in mobilising pressure and causing shame.
Finally, it is clear that petition systems are particularly effective
mechanisms for the elaboration of standards, for application in specific cases. In
comparison the process of reviewing states reports does not give rise to similar
opportunities for expounding on the meaning of the norms in the treaty
concerned. It is only with the use of the General Comments that the monitoring
body may develop a general and understanding of the norms within the treaty
concerned.
15 Schoenberg H, The Implementation of Human Rights by the United Nations Committee (1977)
22 at 37.
16 Ibid at 39.
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3.2.3 Lessons from the International Community
There is a meaningful connection between the international and the domestic
monitoring systems. In my view the domestic system can rely on the
international system to enhance the protection of socio-economic rights.
The international monitoring system has advantages that the domestic
system cannot offer. It provides a basis for a cross-national assessment of a
country's performance in the world as seen from an impartial international
perspective. A body of jurisprudence on these rights has already started to
develop on the international level, which at least provides a time-tested starting
point. The South African Human Rights Commission would be well advised to
take cognisance of this jurisprudence. Moreover, through co-ordination of the
international and domestic procedures the cost and efforts of obtaining and
assessing the required information can be reduced. The time frame for domestic
reporting could be co-ordinated with South Africa's obligations under the
ICESCR because of the large degree of overlap between the rights in question.
The first step, for the Commission, should be to issue guidelines on what
IS expected from the various organs of state. It should have access to
governments reports submitted to the international supervisory body and to the
findings issued by UN Committee. The relationship of the report to the National
Assembly and South Africa's report to the UN Committee will also have to be
carefully considered. The Commission should have compiled an inventory of
the international human rights instruments that relate to the rights in question
and that the government has ratified or intends ratifying (ICESCR). According
to international practice states are encouraged to make use of cross-referencing
between different reports instead of re-submitting the same information where
they have overlapping reporting duties.l"
Internationally NGOs have been recognised as prominent players in the
process. The ability of NGOs to participate freely and effectively in the review
process is critical for putting more pressure on the government for the effective
realisation of human rights including socio-economic rights. Therefore, the
17 General Comment No 1 (1989) at 13.
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Commission has to bring on board NGOs. It is not enough to recognise them in
theory without giving them a platform to exercise their functions.
The manner of protecting socio-economic rights is to an extent depends
on global developments and trends. Increasingly claims must be advanced
within the international as well as domestic legal order. In so doing the capacity
of both domestic and international human rights institutions are enhanced.
Courts are more likely to hold their governments to a purely internal standard of
the right to social security or to an adequate standard of living. They are less
likely to enforce standards and entitlements linked to internationally recognised
social and economic rights."
In other words, our domestic claims will be more successful if
international human rights bodies have identified certain areas in which the
domestic protection fails against international standards. That being the case, it
is important to take our claims and issues forward internationally as well as
domestically and to ensure that UN treaty monitoring bodies give clear
directions to our courts, Commission and the Government.
There is a need to collaborate to ensure that the pressing Issues of
domestic socio-economic rights struggles are addressed at the international
level. The consideration by the UN Committee of the right to social security and
to an adequate standard of living may be useful in convincing the SAHRC,
courts and Parliamentarians of the importance of effective legal remedies to
ensure the realisation of these rights and universal and justiciable standards. The
effective monitoring of socio-economic rights requires constant interaction
between the international and domestic monitoring bodies.
3.3 DOMESTIC SYSTEMOFMONITORING
In this section I discuss the role and the steps to be taken by the South African
Human Rights Commission ("SAHRC") in fulfilling its constitutional
obligation of monitoring human rights including socio-economic rights. The
18 As the courts have a role to play in holding the government to its obligations and to supervise
the implementation of its orders in respect of these rights, their role wiIl be discussed at length
in Chapter Four.
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Commission's primary aim and objective should be to promote socio-economic
rights rather than to criticise the state's performance in respect of these rights.
3.3.1 The Role and the Nature of the Commission's Mandate in Section
184(3)
The SAHRC has a key role to play in monitoring the implementation of court
orders in respect of socio-economic rights. The Commission was established in
terms of section 181(1)(b) of the South African Constitution. It is one of the
institutions described in the Constitution as a "state institution supporting and
strengthening constitutional democracy" in the Republic. It is a watchdog whose
main task is to monitor the actions of the government and the private sector that
may affect human rights."
The Commission is therefore equipped with a powerful information-
gathering tool on the steps taken by the relevant organs of the state to respect,
protect, promote and fulfil socio-economic rights.i'' Section 184(3) of the
Constitution places an obligation on the Commission to request information
each year from relevant organs of the state on the steps that they have taken
towards the realisation of the socio-economic rights. With this information and
the information obtained from other independent sources, the Commission will
be in a strong position to monitor and assess the observance of socio-economic
rights in South Africa.
Therefore, the question could be asked whether is it correct to describe
the system which section 184(3) create as a domestic reporting procedure? In
other words, does the section 184(3) procedure do something similar for socio-
economic rights on the domestic level to what the reporting procedure in terms
of the treaties like the ICESCR do for these rights on the international level? In
my view section 184(3) creates precisely such a system on the domestic level,
whereby state organs are placed under a legal duty to report to an independent
body on their performance.
19 Liebenberg, S. and Pillay, K. Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa (2000) at 53.
20 Section 7(2).
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The essence of the international system of reporting as I have stated
above, is that organs of state are required by law to inform an independent
monitoring body on a regular basis on the extent to which they have managed or
failed to comply with treaty norms. At the heart of the reporting procedure as
enforcement mechanism lies a duty of justification on the one side and a system
of monitoring on the other, a system of introspection and inspection.
The South African Constitution creates such a duty of justification.
There are differences between the two types of reporting. In the one case the
monitoring body is international and dedicated only to monitoring the particular
set of rights in question. In the other case, the monitoring body is domestic and
it has some other functions as well.
However, in both cases the bodies serve as independent monitors. The
sources of the legal obligations on the national and international levels are also
different. In the case of the international reporting the source is the voluntary
decision of the state in question to become a state party to a treaty. In the case of
the section 184(3) procedure the obligation is imposed by the Constitution. That
does not diminish the fact that legal obligations are created in both instances to
provide information on one's performance in respect of the rights in question.
The mandate contained in section 184(3) of the Constitution must be
read in conjunction with the other functions and powers of the Commission that
are provided for in section 184 of the Constitution. The purpose of section
184(3) cannot merely be for the Commission to gather information concerning
socio-economic rights. The information gathered must be analysed and
evaluated in terms of the Commission's duty to monitor and assess the
observance of human rights in the Republic under section 184(1)(c).
In addition, the Commission has the power to take a number of steps in
relation to the information that it obtains. Of particular relevance are its powers
to investigate and to report on the observance of human rights and to take steps
to secure appropriate redress where human rights have been violated. The
Commission identifies a violation of any of the rights in the Bill of Rights it
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may further institute litigation or make recommendations to the relevant organs
of state."
The Commission must submit an annual report that must be tabled in
Parliament. In addition, it is obliged to submit quarterly reports to the President
and Parliament on investigations and its findings. It may also submit reports at
any time if it deems this necessary." Importantly, the end-goal of the section
184(3) process should not be seen as the production of the report. These reports
have the potential to be a valuable public record of the monitoring process if
they identify instances of the violation of socio-economic rights, engage organs
of the state in measures to improve access to these rights and educate them
regarding their obligations, make well-considered recommendations, follow up
on such recommendations, raise public awareness and identify areas of priority
for the next monitoring cycle.
At the end of the day, the value of section 184(3) mandate lies in the
Commission's ability to contribute to making socio-economic rights a reality in
the daily lives of the disadvantaged groups.v' The tabling of a formal report in
Parliament will not achieve this goal on its own. It is essential that the report
receive some form of consideration in the parliamentary system. The report
should be considered by the relevant portfolio committees and perhaps debated
in the National Assembly. In addition, a user-friendly version of the report
should be disseminated to the press and media. These institutions bear the
responsibility of taking matters further by informing the public through the
radio, Internet and television.
It is consequently concluded that section 184(3) does create a system
that can legitimately be referred to as a domestic reporting procedure.
21 Section 184(2)(a) and (b).
22 Section 15(2) of Act 54 of 1994.
56
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
3.3.2 Determining Relevant Organs
In this section I will analyse the duty of the Commission to fulfil its
constitutional mandate of identifying the relevant organs of the state responsible
for socio-economic delivery."
The primary challenge of the Commission is to establish what
constitutes an organ of state and which organs are relevant for the purpose of
this section. This entails an enquiry into which organs are charged with the task
of taking measures towards the realisation of the rights in the Bill of Rights. The
task of identifying relevant organs requires an analysis of the constitutional
division of power between the different levels of government. The three
different levels of government are clearly organs of the state as defined in
section 239(a) and (b) of the Constitution. This does not include the Court or
Judicial Officers.
Another key challenge in the process is the nature of the information that
will be requested from the various organs of the state. It has been argued that the
Commission should focus on socio-economic rights, and develop guidelines to
ensure that organs of state provide it with the relevant data.25
A difficult balance will have to be struck between ensuring that it is
practical and feasible for the relevant organs of state to provide the information,
while, at the same time, the Commission is provided with an effective basis for
evaluating their performance.
3.4 NGO INVOLVEMENTIN THE MONITORING PROCESS
In this section I will analyse NGO involvement in the monitoring process. The
sad reality is that most human rights NGOs are not directly involved in the area
of socio-economic rights. This was highlighted by their non-involvement in
monitoring the court order, along with the Commission in the Grootboom case.
23 Brand, D. and Liebenberg, S. "The Second Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Reports"
(2000) 2 ESR Review 12 at 16.
24 Before the Commission can require organs of state in terms of section 184(3) to provide
information, it has to identify those organs responsible for socio-economic delivery. This is in
line with the obligation imposed by the Constitution.
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There has been a concern raised by human rights activists that they have to be
more directly involved, especially in this area of socio-economic rights.
There is a considerable room for NGO participation in the monitoring
process. Because NGOs are close to the people, they can provide information on
the real problems people experience in getting access to socio-economic rights.
They can also use the Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 to obtain information
in respect of these rights.
The information gathered can be valuable in helping NGOs to compile a
shadow report. Liebenberg defines a shadow report as an NGO report that aims
to highlight information and problems relating to the realisation of socio-
economic rights that are not covered in the official government report."
Governments usually assess themselves in a more favourable light than NGOs,
that are often more critical of the government. NGOs can also monitor the
implementation of the National Action Plan for the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights." It is a detailed plan for implementing a full range of civil,
political, economic, social and cultural rights and also rights to development,
self-determination, peace and environmental protection.
A shadow report can also be submitted to international human rights
bodies. International reporting systems have shown that civil society is central
to an effective monitoring process. For example, the UN Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural rights, which is responsible for supervising states
parties obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights has developed innovative ways of involving NGOs in the
reporting system under the covenant. These include inviting the submission of
shadow reports or alternative reports as well as opportunities for oral
representations.
Indeed, the participation by NGOs in the work of the UN Committee is
the most significant and perhaps the most controversial aspect of the supervision
25 Pillay, K. "Identifying Relevant Organs of State" (1998) Report of a Joint Workshop
Organised by: Community Law Centre (University of the Western Cape) and Centre for Human
Rights (University of Pretoria).
26 Liebenberg, (note 18 above) at 55.
27 Itwas handed in to the UN on 10 December 1998 in response to the commitment in The
Vienna Declaration of Human Rights and Programme of Action adopted by the World
Conference on Human Rights in June 1993.
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system." The reason for this is that the Covenant makes no reference to the
NGO participation in the process. Similarly, the South African Constitution
makes no reference to the NGO participation in the monitoring process. It does
provide for a class action that may be used and for NGOs to act on behalf of the
victims if the government fails to honour its obligations.i" By analogy NGOs
must be entitled to submit written statements and make oral representations to
the monitoring bodies and the government on how they have performed in
respect of the delivery of basic services. The objective of allowing presentation
is to foster wider participation that will make the monitoring process more
transparent. NGO participation should therefore be institutionalised and not
merely encouraged informally.
The major obstacle to creative NGO participation seems to be the lack of
awareness and willingness and the physical and financial constraints on the
organisations working within the spheres of socio-economic rights.l" The
existing human rights NGOs have shown a reluctance to become involved with
the promotion of socio-economic rights." However, there have been calls by,
organisations such as Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and
Black Sash, for access to the information provided to the SAHRC by the organs
of state and for public hearings where comments can be made on the
information.V
The Commission's reporting mechanisms offers an institutionalised
opportunity to comment on the extent of socio-economic rights delivery.r'
Public hearings must therefore be arranged to allow comments on the
information provided by government departments. For example, the Black Sash
has a particular interest in monitoring the realisation of the right of access to
28 Craven, M. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A
Perspective on its Development (1995) at 81.
29 Section 38.
30 Craven (note 27 above) at 82.
31 Ibid.
32 Liebenberg, S. "The South African Human Rights Commission" (1998) 1Economic and
Social Rights Review at 7.
33 Bevan, G. "The Impact of the Different Conceptions ofSocio-Economic Rights in South
Africa" (1999) LLM Thesis, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg at 62.
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social security in South Africa." lts efforts are frustrated by their lack of access
to government reports and their inability to comment on them.
What role then does the Commission currently envisage for NGOs? The
approach adopted by the Commission is that civil society will not be provided
with the information received by the Commission from the government
departments until the provisional composite report has been prepared." This
makes it impossible for NGOs to participate meaningfully.
As I have stated, the participation of NGOs is vital to the long-term
success of the monitoring mechanism." Denying NGOs immediate access to the
information is further at odds with the sentiments of the then, Chairperson of the
South African Human Rights Commission, Dr Barney Pityana. He argues that
the implementation of social and economic rights requires democratic
participation by society at all levels: an informed civil society, a democratic
government and state institutions that monitor and inspire human rights action."
People must be enabled to tell the Commission and the government what the
situation is on the ground."
If this is the objective, the Commission cannot be the only monitoring
body. If the monitoring is to succeed, there has to be more public and NGO
participation.l" NGOs and the public should have access to the information
provided by the organs of state, as soon as it is released to the Commission. The
Commission can only assess the progress made in the realisation of socio-
economic rights in South Africa if the information provided by the government
is checked against alternative information submitted by NGOs, individuals and
trade unions.
This would also be a more inclusive procedure and will give NGOs and
others an opportunity to comment before the Commission drafts its report/"
More should be done to analyse the information submitted before the report is
34 Interview "Black Sash" held in Cape Town on the 03 June 2001.
35 The First and Second Report on The Monitoring of the Realisation ofSocio-Economic Rights.
36 Bevan (note 32 above) at 63.
37 Concluding Address, Workshop on the South African Human Rights Commission (1997) 35
at 37.
381bid.
39 Interview with Doctor Meidlay, "Department of Welfare" Eastern Cape 21 May 2001.
40 Interview with Mr Kumalo, "Department of Education" Eastern Cape 21 May 2001.
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drafted. A more inclusive and critical approach will not only promote a more
balanced assessment, but it will also place a wealth of resources and experience
at the disposal of the Commission, free of charge. We need a civil society who
knows where change should come from. According to Danie Brand:
"Experience has shown that state representatives often portray the
situation in their country in too rosy manner, whereas NGOs and civil
society tend to be more critical. It is only by being exposed to both
perspectives that a balanced and credible assessment can be made".41
Also, Parliamentary processes are only effective when complemented with
lobbying and advocacy of the civil society. Civil society is able to create
political pressure unlike the interventions by the Commission and the
Constitutional Court. Civil society may remove barriers that stood in the way of
people gaining access to socio-economic rights,42 by highlighting the cases of
groups who are particularly vulnerable and disadvantaged and by placing
pressure on the state to assist these groups and to ensure that they gain access to
the rights in question. They are often the only voice for rural women, people
living with disabilities or chronic illness, poor children and elderly persons.
Finally the State, the HRC and the Constitutional Court have to be
informed about grassroots experiences of the people if a more holistic
conceptualisation of these rights is to be achieved. The Poverty Hearings
organised by the Commission for Gender Equality (CGE), South African
National NGO Coalition (SANGOCO) and the South African Human Rights
Commission (SAHRC), illustrated the hardship and suffering experienced by
the people on the ground.f A closer look at the poverty hearings reveals how
NGOs may open space for the marginalised to be heard.
3.5 NETWORKING STRATEGIESFOR NGOs
Effective participation will require NGOs to share information and collaborate
in formulating strategies for their involvement in the monitoring process.
41 Brand, D. "South African Human Rights Commission" Economic and Social Rights Review
(1998) 2 at 11.
42 Bevan (note 32 above) at 81.
43 The hearings were launched on 24 February 1998 and ran from March to June 1998.
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At the moment there is limited opportunities for NGOs to participate in
the monitoring function entrusted to the Commission by the Constitution. One
of the creative ways in which NGOs could play a vital role is through a
compilation of the shadow report as mentioned above. This will require a joint
effort. Another way in which NGOs may become more directly involved in the
process, is by implementing a carefully thought-out socio-economic rights
litigation strategy with the aim of incrementally establishing positive
precedents. Establishing and funding a group of progressive lawyers who would
assist the communities to enforce their socio-economic rights can do this. NGOs
should further identify and take up cases, including the preparation of amicus
briefs as the Legal Resources Centre and the Community Law Centre
(University of the Western Cape) have done in the Grootboom44 case.
Other activities that should be co-ordinated include: social mobilisation,
policy research and formulation, lobbying individuals, legislatures, statutory
bodies and international agencies and information sharing." Co-ordinated
actions have greater impact and results as recognised by the report on the
Poverty Hearings." This could cover both the process of giving effect to socio-
economic rights and the substantive impact of government programmes on the
socio-economic rights of communication with NGOs work.
Although the Constitution" and the Promotion of Access to Information
Act 2 of 2000 provide for access to information, the knowledge of legal rights
and remedies by poor people leaves much to be desired. Legal advice offices
could play an important role in providing the necessary information. The
restructuring of the Legal Aid system must include the right of poor people to be
provided with information and advice on their constitutional rights, particularly
their socio-economic rights. NGOs could lobby for a portion of the State's
Legal Aid budget to be allocated to local citizen's advice offices for the purpose
of providing access to information and advice on all human rights including
44 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2000 (Il)
BCLR 1253 (CC).
45 Ntombela-Ndzimande, P. "The Role of the Independent Commissions and Civil Society"
(1999) 1 Economic and Social Rights Review at 20.
46 Report on Poverty Hearings Organised by CGE, SANGOCO, SAHRC, (U W C) Community
Law Centre, July 1998 at 171.
47 Section 32.
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socio-economic rights and it is encouraging that there are developments in this
regard.
Lastly, it is also encouraging that Schools for Practical Legal Training
have included socio-economic rights into their curricula. Therefore this could be
used by NGOs to contribute to the emergence of a new generation of human
rights lawyers and activists.
3.6 ANALYSIS OF THEMONITORINGFUNCTION
The purpose here is to examine the manner in which the SAHRC has managed
or failed to carry out its constitutional mandate. I do not intend to provide an
overview and critique of specific reports of government departments but rather
of the Commission's monitoring function and of the Commission's Socio-
Economic Report. I will focus on the monitoring of court orders in Chapter
Four. This, more general critique will focus on a comparative analysis of the
First48 and Second" Socio-Economic Report.
Three aspects of the monitoring procedure are discussed separately: the
process of preparing the report, the protocols or questionnaire in terms of which
the information was gathered and the report itself.
3.6.1 The Process
The second annual cycle of monitoring socio-economic rights was characterised
by the efforts of the Commission to assert its control over the monitoring
process. The Commission maintained the attitude adopted in the first monitoring
cycle that is that it would not make the departmental reports available to civil
societies prior to the production of its own report. 50 This was confirmed by the
member of the Commission in a private interview held in Cape Town on 13
March 2001. As a result the involvement of the NGOs in the process was kept at
a mmimum.
48 The 1998-1999 Socio-Economic Report was launched on 25 March 1999.
49 The 1999-2000 Socio-Economic Report was launched on 15 September 2000.
50 See Thipanyane, T. "The First Economic and Social Report" (1998) 1ESR Review at 11-12.
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The Commission justifies withholding the information by arguing that
organs of state submit their reports to them in confidence. If it were to make
these reports available to organs of civil society, it may harm or embarrass a
particular organ of state. This response is difficult to understand. 51 What
possible harm could come from making information available to NGOs that is in
any event part of a public record? The government departments were perfectly
willing to provide the reports they had sent to the Commission.V Why then
should the Commission be reluctant to make reports available to NGOs? The
absurd attitude of the Commission undermines the monitoring process.
The Commission remains unwilling to involve civil society directly and
meaningfully in the process. The fact is that the Commission does not have
sufficient resources to carry out its mandate. 53 Civil society organisations can
provide invaluable information and analysis to the Commission. NGOs, if
allowed to study the information provided by the organs of state, can provide
the Commission with alternative information against which to verify the
government's reports. They can also make available to the Commission their
own experience and evaluation of the government programmes and policies.
This could assist the Commission greatly.
The lack of NGO participation in the process is further bad for the
Commission's image. As an institution established for the purpose of upholding
the spirit and the objectives of the Bill of Rights, it should be seen to function in
a transparent, open and participatory way. Withholding information from
NGO's and not actively seeking input from civil society on the realisation of
social and economic rights does not project a good image.
In order to ensure response from the departments, the Commission was
at pains to make sure that the departments took the section 184(3) mandate
seriously. It wanted to avoid the bad experience it had in the first monitoring
cycle. It emphasised the need for the departments to respond in time to its
request for the information. Eventually the Commission, after various
51 See also Brand, D. "The South African Human Rights Commission- First Economic and
Social Rights Report" (1999) 2 Economic and Social Rights Review 18 at 20 for a discussion of
this problem during the course of the first monitoring cycle.
52 Interviews held with Eastern Cape Provincial Departments on 21 and 22 May 2001.
53 See (note 34 above) and Mr Southwell (Project Co-Ordinator, Western Cape) confirmed this.
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extensions of deadlines, subpoenaed 36 Departments who had not submitted
their reports by the final deadline. 54 The Commission took a strong action
against government departments to ensure that they responded to its request for
information.
The heads of these departments were subpoenaed to appear before the
Commission to explain the reasons for their failure to submit the information
requested. Some departments were not happy with the action of the
Commission's and referred to it as "unreasonable". They cited the lack of co-
ordination within their departments and training by the Commission as the
reason for their failure to comply with the request.f
The subpoenaing had the desired effect because all the departments
managed to submit their reports before the return date'", except for the
departments of Health in the Eastern Capeand Education in Northern Province.
The strong action by the Commission to ensure compliance has to be welcomed.
However, it should as a rule be avoided by ensuring that for effective and
smooth administration relating to the rights in question, maximum participation
from all stakeholders is important.
One of the most important advantages of the monitoring process is the
opportunity it creates for a constructive dialogue between the monitoring body
and those who are monitored. The Commission has the opportunity through its
monitoring process to influence the policies, laws and programmes of the
government through education and recommendations. The adversarial
atmosphere created by the strong action of the Commission to issue out
subpoenas is not conducive to the process of constructive engagement.
Subpoenaing is particularly problematic when one takes into account that no
substantial effort was made by the Commission to ensure that government
officials responsible for preparing the reports received education and training on
socio-economic rights and the specifics of the reporting process.
54 The Eastern Cape Provincial Departments for example were on top of the list.
55 See (note 39 above).
56 08 and 09 December 1999 for the Hearings for non-compliance with the HRC request for
submission of the information on the measures taken by the Departments on the progressive
realisation of socio-economic rights in South Africa.
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The Commission has identified the lack of awareness, understanding and
knowledge of the section 184(3) process'" as one of the most important reasons
for the inadequacy of the reports received from the departments. In the light of
this problem it is critical for the Commission to engage in a process of training
government officials who have to prepare reports for the Commission. They
need to be trained on the technical aspects of the monitoring process: how to
prepare the report, what information to include and what format to follow. They
should receive training on the meaning of socio-economic rights and the duties
they impose on the state. This training can be provided by the Commission or
through NGOs, but it will have to be relatively intensive in order to have the
desired effect.
3.6.2 The Protocols
The Commission gathers information from the relevant organs of the state
through questionnaires (referred to as 'protocols'). The nature and role of these
protocols was one of the most contentious issues during the preparation of the
first monitoring cycle.58 The protocols that formed the basis of the first
monitoring cycle represented a compromise between the views held respectively
by the Commission and NGOs in the process at the time. This was intended to
form the basis for further development of protocols in the future.
However the Commission developed the protocols for the second
monitoring cycle with the assistance of a Canadian consultant specialising in the
quantitative analysis of social and economic policy. These differed
fundamentally from the protocols used in the first monitoring cycle.59 The new
protocols have created problems that go to the core of the monitoring process
and will influence their practical efficacy as human rights monitoring tools.
The new protocols are problematic for two reasons: they ask too much
from the departments and they ask the wrong questions. During the first
57 South African Human Rights Commission "Second Economic and Social Rights Report"
(2000) at 13.
58 Liebenberg, S. "First Economic and Social Rights Report" Economic and Social Rights
Review (1999) 1 at 7.
59 See Brand (note 51 above), and also Brand, D. "The Second Economic and Social Report"
(2000) ESR Review 13 at 14.
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monitoring cycle, the approach was to request a modest amount of information.
This enabled the government to respond adequately and the Commission was
able to process and analyse the information it received." This set of protocols
focused on:
• the impact of past discriminatory policies and practices on the
implementation of socio-economic rights;
• the understanding by government departments of the obligations
imposed on them by the socio-economic rights in the Constitution;
• the policies, laws and programmes planned or in place to implement
socio-economic rights; and
• the existence of information and monitoring systems within government
departments through which to track the implementation of socio-
economic rights."
The questions were formulated in such a way that the organs were able to
determine which information the Commission needed. In essence the protocols
focused on very clearly defined and limited batches of information, and it was
designed to give the Commission a relatively clear picture of the measures being
taken by the relevant organs of the state towards the realisation of socio-
economic rights. The more modest approach also avoided overlap with other
processes of information gathering, such as those conducted by Statistics South
Africa. They also stressed to the organs of state that the realisation of socio-
economic rights is a constitutional obligation.
The focus in the first monitoring cycle, on the measures adopted by
government departments was appropriate. Sadly, the Commission, in designing
its protocol for the second cycle of monitoring consciously departed from the
modest approach adopted in the first monitoring cycle.62 The new protocols
required extensive and detailed statistical information from the government
departments. They were asked to provide statistical data for seven listed
categories of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. This expected too much.
60 See Thipanyane (note 50 above) at 13.
61 Ibid at 14.
62 See Brand D. (note 51 above) at 14.
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The final report bears witness to the fact that in general the departments could
not provide this kind of information.
The Commission is not adequately equipped to analyse large volumes of
statistical information effectively. To ask the departments this kind of detailed
statistical information is a waste of effort and energy. In any event, much of the
information the Commission requested is already available from other
institutions in a conveniently digested form.63 Some of the information
requested is also of the wrong kind.
Also, the role of a particular government department in realising the
rights to food, for example, cannot be assessed through examining abstract
statistical information relating to the nutritional status of the population. These
statistics may reveal that there are people without access to sufficient food, but
they do not indicate which organ of state should be held responsible and why
the situation exists. Is it due to a lack of a coherent nutritional strategy on the
part of the government, or that the relevant policies and laws are not being
properly enforced? Only through a close examination of measures adopted by
relevant organs of state and their impact, is it possible to assess whether
government is fulfilling its constitutional duty in terms of section 7(2) to
respect, protect, promote and fulfil socio-economic rights.
3.6.3 TheReport
Despite the problems with the completion of questionnaires, the second report
reflects a number of key problem areas in the implementation of socio-
economic rights in South Africa.64 A welcome feature of the report is the fact
that it seeks to evaluate. This presents an important departure from the
Commission's understanding of its section 184(3) mandate during the first
monitoring cycle. It seems that the Commission now accepts that its role in the
socio-economic rights monitoring process is indeed to evaluate the performance
of the government in realising socio-economic rights, and to report its
assessment to Parliament.
63 See Liebenberg (note 58 above) at 110.
64 Ibid at 282.
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Indeed, one of the main functions of the Commission is to "monitor and
assess the observance of human rights in the Republic". Section 184(3) is not
only an important tool for information gathering in the sphere of socio-
economic rights. It is intended to enable over-all monitoring and evaluation by
the Commission. The evaluation of government protocols is separately treated
in sections of the report under the heading "Commentary" and is followed up by
a list of "Recommendations" addressed to a particular department involved.
However, unfortunately these sections of the report tend to focus on an
evaluation of the manner in which a particular department reported to the
Commission, rather than the content of the report itself. This is understandable
given the fact that the reports submitted by the departments were largely
inadequate, and did not provide the information the Commission required. In
future, it would be important for the Commission to focus more on the
evaluation of the substantive content of the report.
In so far as it deals with substance, the focus in the evaluation of the
report is placed on an analysis of the statistical indicators relating to social
services. More emphasis need to be given to assessing whether the measures
taken by the relevant organs in fact prioritise the effective realisation of socio-
economic rights within the shortest possible time and whether they are effective
in their implementation.
In order to hold the government accountable for a failure to realise
socio-economic rights, it is imperative that there is a thorough analysis of the
legislation, policies and programmes adopted by all spheres of government and
the manner in which they are implemented. This kind of analysis will of course
only be possible if the Commission solicits divergent views from civil society
on the effects of the government policies and practices, something that the
Commission has failed to do in its current report.
A further shortcoming of the report is that it makes no reference to the
recommendations made in the first report. The protocols did not contain any
follow-up questions to government departments on the extent to which these
recommendations were accepted and implemented.f It is consequently not clear
65 See Liebenberg (note 58 above).
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whether the Commission took action to follow-up on the recommendations it
made in the first report. The end-goal of the monitoring process should not be
seen as the production of the report.
The report has the potential to be a valuable public record. But the value
of the process is even more than that. If the report is used creatively it can
achieve a number of important further objectives. It should enable the
Commission to enter into a process of constructive dialogue, aimed at designing
measures of implementing socio-economic rights better and faster.
The report should further be used by the Commission to identify cases of
violations of socio-economic rights, in which it can intervene. For example, the
Commission has identified "corruption" on the part of government officials in
most of the Eastern Cape Departments as a major cause of under-performance.
Corruption has affected the socio-economic delivery and made it difficult for
the disadvantaged groups to access the rights in question and therefore the
Commission has to act on such gross misconduct. In this respect, the tabling of
the report in Parliament is not good enough. The Commission will have to
ensure the report receives the considered attention of Parliament. This could be
done through a debate on the report in the National Assembly and by making
the report available and accessible to the public.
3.7 CONCLUSION
The fact that socio-economic rights have been entrenched in the Covenant and
our Constitution is commendable, but the acid test lies in the manner in which
these rights are realised. It is encouraging to note that the bodies entrusted with
the responsibility of ensuring the effective realisation of these rights are using
everything at their disposal to realise these rights effectively. As the process is
new for the SAHRC it is extremely important that they look for guidance from
the international community as to how to do it effectively. The Commission has
made mistakes, but useful experience has been acquired. The relations that the
Commission has managed to establish with all the parties concerned will
continue to improve in order to ensure more effective monitoring in future.
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"The constitution makers decided in their wisdom to provide a
mechanism whereby economic and social rights (considered by some to
be of dubious justiciability and enforceability) could go beyond mere
aspirations and unenforceable directives. The Constitutional makers
intended to make these rights substantial and effective.
In order to take up this challenge we must hold the government
accountable through requiring them to justify their laws and policies, the
setting of priorities and the way in which the resources of our country
are being spent. We will assess whether decisions taken by the
government are reasonably targeted at the realisation of the economic
and social rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights.
As we seek to do this work, we recognise that we have enormous
resources in our country. The NGOs and other organisations have been
working on these issues in other ways. We need to consult with them".66
I conclude by quoting the Chairperson of the SAHRC, Dr. Barney
Pityana, on the Commission's role in monitoring the implementation of socio-
economic rights in South Africa:
66 See (note 37 above) at 18.
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CHAPTER FOUR
SUCCESSES AND FAILURES
4.1 INTRODUCTION
As I have been emphasizing throughout this thesis, although socio-economic
rights have been entrenched in the Constitution, the acid test is whether these
rights are implemented by the state and whether the judiciary is able to hold the
state to its obligations as set out in the Bill of Rights. The purpose of litigation
in respect of socio-economic rights is to use the courts to force the government
to fulfil its constitutional commitments. Van Bueren I suggests a number of
other reasons for litigating, including grass roots mobilisation and
empowerment; the promotion of knowledge of cultural identities, parliamentary
procedures and objectives; and even the fight against the eradication of poverty.
South Africa has committed itself to the protection of socio-economic
rights as justiciable rights. In In re: Certification of the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa.' the first decision in which this commitment was dealt
with, the Constitutional Court boldly stated the following about the enforcement
of socio-economic rights and the traditional objections to their entrenchment:
"The second objection was that the inclusion of these rights is
inconsistent with the doctrine of separation of powers because the
judiciary would have to encroach upon the proper terrain of the
legislature and executive. In particular the objectors argued that it would
result in the courts dictating to the government how the budget should be
allocated. It is true that the inclusion of socio-economic rights may result
in courts making orders that have direct implications for budgetary
matters. However, even when a Court enforces civil and political rights
such as equality, freedom of speech and the right to a fair trial, the order
it makes will often have such implications. A Court may require the
provision of legal aid, or the extension of state benefits to a class of
people who formerly were not beneficiaries of such benefits. In our view
it cannot be said that by including socio-economic rights within a bill of
rights, a task is conferred upon the courts so different from that ordinarily
IVan Bueren G. "Alleviating Poverty Through the Constitutional Court" (1999) 15 SAJHR 52
at 52.
21996 (lO) BCLR 1253 (CC).
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conferred upon them by a bill of rights that it results in a breach of the
separation of powers.t"
The Constitutional Court therefore appeared to have no principled concern with
the courts dictating to the government how it should spend money. In fact, the
court appears to have accepted the inevitability that some of its decisions might
have budgetary implications. Subsequently, in the case of August v Electoral
Commission.' the court ordered the government to marshal its resources to
protect a vital interest (prisoner's right to vote) and the effective implementation
of its order. This boded well for the enforcement of human rights, as it seemed
that the courts would approach the question of budgetary allocation with a
degree of flexibility and creativeness characteristic of a social activist judiciary.
It must be noted, however, that the August case dealt with civil rights. At this
stage it was still unclear whether the court would approach socio-economic
rights as boldly.
The disadvantage of being one of the few countries in the world to have
entrenched socio-economic rights is thatthere is little precedent in foreign case
law to assist our courts in interpreting and enforcing socio-economic rights. Any
guidance from abroad would be valuable, but it will have to kept in mind that
each legal system crafts rules to accommodate the interests peculiar to that
particular system.' Foreign case law should therefore be treated with caution."
Another hurdle to the implementation of socio-economic rights is the
principle of stare decisis, which has engendered a judiciary with a strong
attachment to legal precedent. In terms of the principle of stare decisis, judges
have traditionally justified their judgements by relying on previous decisions,
arguing by way of analogy rather than relying on policy reasons for developing
the law. The result has been that, in the absence of clear precedent to support a
decision, judges often shy away from formulating new or innovative legal rules
3 Ibid at para 77.
4 1999 (3) BCLR 1 (CC).
5 See Park-Ross v The Director for Serious Economic Offences 1995 (2) BCLR 198 (CC).
6 See Addo M. "Justiciabilty Re-Examined" in Beddard and Hill et al (eds) Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: Progress and Achievement (1986) 93 at 95 where he argues that there is
normally a degree of subjectivity involved in the identification by courts of the entitlements and
duties created by the Bill of Rights.
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"judges were able to kill themselves into believing that they had no
choice in interpreting racist and repressive statutes. It was the body of
statutory law that contained the law of apartheid and no more. Anything
else would not have sat comfortably with the judiciary if judicial choice
were to be accepted as part of the interpretative process"."
or principles.' This is the result of the deep-seated conservative positivism
prevalent in the legal fraternity in South Africa, which dictates that judges are
not the makers of the law but merely adjudicators of Iaw.' Southwell expresses
this sentiment as follows:
While judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights is one of the weapons in
the arsenal against poverty.l" it must also be acknowledged that litigation is by
no means the only means (or even the most important means) of bringing about
the desired changes in our society. Other institutions have been created by the
Constitution to monitor the implementation of these rights. Ideally, therefore,
the interpretation and enforcement of socio-economic rights must occur through
a collaborative and interactive process involving the legislature, the executive,
the courts, the South African Human Rights Commission and non-governmental
organisations.
As mentioned m Chapter One, it was the understanding of the
constitutional drafters that sometimes the courts would have to move beyond the
narrow and rigid confines imposed by the doctrine of separation of powers, and
pronounce on questions that are traditionally regarded as within the realm of
other branches of the government. Il Our courts are empowered, whenever they
decide any issue involving the interpretation, protection and enforcement of the
Constitution, to make any order that is just and equitable.V But the courts
cannot enforce their own orders. The proper implementation of court orders is
7 De Vos P. "Pious Wishes or Directly Enforceable Rights (1997) 13 SAJHR 67 at 74.
8 See Southwell V. "Working for the Progressive Change in the South African Courts" (1995)
28 ei/sa 261 at 266.
9lbid.
10 Ibid at 267.
II See (note 2 above) at para 78.
12 See section 172 (1) (b) which states that:
When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court may make any order
that is just and equitable, including, an order limiting the retrospective effect of the
declaration of invalidity and an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any
period and on any conditions, to allow the competent authority to correct the defect.
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therefore crucial to any attempt to use litigation in order to advance socio-
economic rights.
This brings me to the purpose of this Chapter. Firstly, I will describe
some remedies that are available for the enforcement of socio-economic rights.
Secondly, I will refer to foreign jurisprudence to determine the extent to which
South African courts can rely on such precedents for the development of our
law. India, in particular, may have some answers for South Africa. It has one of
the few judiciaries that have been vociferous, even aggressive in protecting and
promoting the rights of the poor, and its case law may be of particular assistance
to South African courts.
Lastly, in order to determine whether the courts have succeeded in their
supervisory function, I will analyse the impact of the remedies given by the
South African courts in the few cases dealing with socio-economic rights that
have come before them. Particular attention will be paid to the use of the
structural interdict, which is aimed at ensuring that the violator of the
fundamental right rectifies the breach by setting up a supervisory mechanism 13
The manner in which the Human Rights Commission has been used to monitor
court orders will be examined in this part of the chapter. Therefore, the main
issue examined in this Chapter, is the enforcement of socio-economic rights
through the proper implementation of court orders, in which structural interdicts
given by the courts provide for effective monitoring of the implementation of
court orders in respect of these rights.
4.2 REMEDIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC
RIGHTS
While there is agreement that it is necessary to alleviate poverty and suffering
by the realising of socio-economic rights, there is still no agreement on the most
effective ways of realising these rights.l" Although there are other remedies for
the effective implementation of socio-economic rights, the most important and
See also section 167 (7) which states that: A constitutional matter includes any issue
involving the interpretation, protection or enforcement of the Constitution.
13 De Waal 1. "The Bill of Rights Handbook 4ed (2001) at 193.
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effective remedy that has emerged is the 'structural interdict'. There appears to
be some resistance to the granting of this remedy. It is considered to be radical
in nature and to burden the courts with the functions of the executive, i.e. the
execution of court orders. In my view there is no reason why courts should be
hesitant to grant this remedy.
Section 38 provides that whenever a fundamental right has been
infringed or threatened, a court may grant appropriate relief. It follows that a
court's choice of remedy in any case where a fundamental right has been
violated or threatened is determined only by what is just, equitable and
appropriate. A striking feature of the Constitution is that the courts are given the
widest possible power to develop and forge new remedies for the protection of
constitutional rights and the enforcement of constitutional duties. The
Constitutional Court has also been emphasizing the need for constitutional
remedies to 'look to the future' and the need for 'effective remedies'. I shall
argue below that the structural interdict, more than any of the other available
remedies fulfil these two criteria. Apart from the structural interdict, there are a
number of other constitutional remedies, which may be used with some effect.
These include:
• orders of invalidity" as the Court has done in Despatch Municipality v
Sunridge Estate and Development Corporation'? when it declared
invalid the provisions of the Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 1951;
• the development of the common law to give effect to the constitutional
rights; by for example awarding damages 17
• procedural remedies, such as the applications for access to information,
for reasons for decisions made and for access to justice 18
Trengove is of the view that litigation about socio-economic rights often
presents features that call for the development and the creation of new and more
effective remedies. The reasons are:
14 Majola B. "A Response to Craig Scott: A South African Perspective" (1999) 1ESR Review at
6.
15 Section 172 (1) (a).
16 1997 (8) BCLR 1115 (SE).
17 Section 173 and section 8 (3).
18 See sections 32 (1), 33 (2) and 34.
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• litigation is undertaken in the interests of communities or classes of
people and not only in the interest of specified individuals.
• such classes of people are usually poor, politically and socially weak and
dependent on the state for the provision of basic socio-economic
services, as a result of which they lack the political and social power to
get basic services without judicial intervention.
• they accordingly have a particular interest in the enforcement of the
positive duties of the state to take action towards the provision of socio-
economic services.l"
The difficulty is that legal remedies have historically, at least in the area of
constitutional law, been negative rather than positive. A court would typically
strike legislation down or grant a prohibitory interdict for the violation or a
threatened violation of a fundamental right. This negative and defensive type of
remedy is of course of little assistance to a poor community wishing to realise a
socio-economic right. In contrast, the rich and powerful, who are able to look
after themselves, usually invoke the Constitution only to prevent or strike down
state action that interferes with their lives."
Rather than negative remedies, the realisation of socio-economic rights
requires a court to give positive relief. In my view, there are only three
appropriate remedies for a failure to realise a socio-economic right. They are an
award of damages (preventive damages and reparation in kind) orders to enact
legislation and structural interdicts. Of the three, the structural interdict has
proved to be the most effective.
19 Trengove W. "Judicial Remedies for Violations ofSocio-Econornic Rights" (1999) 1 ESR
Review at 8.
20 Minister of Public Works and others v Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association and others
2001 (7) BCLR 652 (CC) is an example ofa case where the relatively affluent people
unsuccessfully tried to challenge the power of the government to establish an emergency camp
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4.2.1 PreventiveDamages
In Fase'il case the Constitutional Court upheld an exception to a claim for
constitutional damages that included an element of punitive damages. Among
the reasons given by the Court was that:
• damages of this nature exacted punishment without the due process
safeguards applicable to a criminal trial;22
• there was no reason to believe that such damages would be an effective
deterrent against individuals or systematic repetition of police
brutality. 23
"
• the plaintiff is given an unjustified windfall denied to other victims of
the same conductr'" and
• scarce public resources could be better employed in structural and
systematic ways to eliminate or substantially reduce the causes of the
infringement. 25
These objections seem to be valid, but as Varney points out, an award of
'preventive' rather than 'punitive' damages may not raise the same concerns.f
Damages directed only at one specific and discrete violation in the past does not
address the threat of existing and ongoing violations posed by a delinquent state
institution" Rather they require the court to look back to the past in order to
determine how to compensate the victim or even to punish the violator.
Preventive damages on the other hand recognise and address an existing threat
and seek to remove it from society in order to prevent future violations rather
than merely giving solace to a victim.
Preventive damages are not awarded in favour of the one specific victim of a
human rights violation. It could have been awarded against the state in favour of
on the state land to those who had no access to the land, no roof over their heads and were in
dire need for adequate housing.
21 Fose vMinister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC).
22 Ibid at para 65.
23 At para 72.
24 At para 84.
25 At para 103.
26 Varney H. "Forging New Tools: A Note on Fose v Minister of Safety and Security" (1998)
14 SAJHR at 336.
27 Trengove (note 18 above) at 9.
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an independent body or private agency that is skilled in and dedicated to the
prevention of the type of violation. An award designed to prevent police
brutality may for instance be made to the Independent Complaints Directorate,
the SAHRC or an NGO active in the combat of police brutality, especially
where such a body has effectively litigated the case on behalf of the victim or in
the public interest. Because such an award is designed to prevent future
violations rather than to punish violations of the past, the amount of the award
should be based on the cost of prevention rather than on the injury inflicted in
the past.
Before the award is made, the proposed recipient of the award may be called
upon to present a plan of action and may be ordered to report to the court on its
implementation and the effectiveness of the preventive measures taken. Such an
award would also be forward-looking, community-orientated and structural.
Although damages could therefore be developed as a remedy for the
violations of fundamental rights, including socio-economic rights, the
jurisprudence of the courts, more especially of the Constitutional Court, is not
particularly encouraging at present. In short, it will take a mammoth effort to
persuade the Court to grant the type of 'preventative' damages in the manner
described above. However, there are situations where a declaration of invalidity
or an interdict would make so little sense that an award of this nature would be
the only form of relief that will vindicate the fundamental right and deter future
infringements. The substantial award of damages may also encourage victims to
litigate, which may in itself serve as a vindication of the Constitution and a
deterrent against breaching rights.i" For these reasons, I do not believe that
damages should be completely discarded as a remedy.
4.2.2 Reparation in Kind
A conventional award of damages in delict seeks to compensate the victim in
money for the injury inflicted on his person or property. Such an award may
often be inappropriate to compensate the victims of past violations of socio-
economic rights because the harm done may be too widespread. How much
28 De Waal J. (note 13 above) at 178.
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does one pay, for example, to victims of unfair race discrimination in the
provision of education, pervasive throughout a town, region or province over a
long period of time? Imagine that the victimised group did receive some
education, but of an inferior quality compared to that given to the privileged
group. How are the victims of the violations of this kind to be compensated for
the harm they have suffered because of the past violations of their constitutional
rights? Individualised awards of compensatory damages would be manifestly
inappropriate. It would be impossible to identify all the individual victims and
to determine the harm they have suffered because of the inferior education
provided to them. Any attempt at such identification and assessment would be a
logistical nightmare that would devour valuable resources in a hopeless and
inadequate attempt to determine who should get what. In any event, there will
be several 'technical obstacles' to such a claim, such as the fact that the
Constitution does not operate retrospectively, the operation of prescription
periods and the like.
Another way of addressing the problem would be to order the state to
provide appropriate remedial services for the benefit of the victimised group as
a whole, rather than to resort to individualised awards of damages in cash. An
action for an order requiring the state to provide remedial education to the
victims of past race discrimination in the schools system could conceivably be
instituted. The purpose of the award is the same as that of a conventional award
of compensatory damages in delict. It is merely the form of the award that is
tailored to suit the nature of the violation and its impact.
However, our courts are unlikely to be enthusiastic about this type of
relief. Apart from the fact that there is no precedent for this in South Africa (and
as far as I could establish elsewhere), the implementation of this type of order
will have to be closely supervised by the court. An order of this kind can
obviously not simply be made and left to the defendant to determine the manner
and form of its implementation. Itwould require the court to involve itself in the
specifics of the remedial action to be taken and often also in the on-going
supervision of the implementation of the order. As I will explain more fully
below, our courts are hesitant to involve themselves with the execution of their
orders on an on-going basis.
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4.2.3 Orders to Enact Legislation
The formulation of human rights, including socio-economic rights, entrenched
in the Constitution is peppered with duties imposed on the state to enact
legislation within a reasonable time.29 Indeed, the Constitution explicitly
provides that all obligations imposed by the Constitution must be fulfilled30
diligently and without delay." These provisions bind all persons to whom and
organs of state to which it applies.V The Constitutional Court is explicitly
afforded the power to decide that Parliament or the President has failed to fulfil
a constitutional obligation.F
However, one can anticipate that the court will be slow to order
parliament to pass particular legislation to give effect to socio-economic rights.
Judicial restraint in this area arises from valid concerns regarding the
institutional roles and competencies of the judiciary and the parliament. The
question is: should a court ever compel an elected legislature to enact legislation
against its will? In my view, in defined circumstances, a court may do so.
The appropriate first step when parliament or provincial legislature has
failed to enact legislation essential to the protection or fulfilment of socio-
economic rights should however be a declaration that should specify that the
failure to enact the necessary legislation is unconstitutional. In the absence of
any mandatory relief the declaration would leave it to the legislature, to design
an appropriate scheme to remedy its failure to comply with its positive duties. In
appropriate circumstances the declaration may be accompanied by broad
normative guidelines on the positive action required to remedy the breach and
the periods within which the legislation should be adopted.r'
29 See Schedule 6, Item 21(1) which states that: Where the new Constitution requires the
enactment of national or provincial legislation, that legislation must be enacted by the relevant
authority within a reasonable period of the date of the new Constitution took effect.
30 See section 2 of the Supremacy Clause.
31 See section 237 of the Constitution.
32 See section 165(5).
33 Section 167(4)(e). See also Klaaren 1. "Judicial Remedies" et al (eds) in Chaskalson M.
Constitutional Law of South Africa (1996) at 9.4 (e).
34 It is submitted that such general guidelines and recommendations are within the court's power
to make any order that is just and equitable. See section 172( 1)(b).
81
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
As the state has a wide range of legislative options to give effect to its
positive duties in relation to these rights." the guidelines for the declaration
should be broad. The desired effect is to stimulate the appropriate legislative
response. The guidelines should highlight the constitutional issues at stake and
may galvanise public pressure on government to fulfil its constitutional
obligations. Ultimately, such a declaration forms part of the constitutional
dialogue, not only between the branches of government, but also with society as
a whole. If government persists, in the face of such an order, to remedy the
omission, a follow-up application seeking mandatory relief could be brought. As
I stated at the outset, if they are serious about the protection of socio-economic
rights, the courts may on occasion have to act in a more pro-active and
inquisitorial fashion and intrude further into the legislative and executive
domain than they have done in the past.
4.2.4 Supervisory Jurisdiction
Our conventional remedies postulate that the court makes an order once and for
all, which is enforced by execution if it sounds in money, or by punishment for
contempt of court if it does not. Because the order is made once and for all, it
has to be sufficiently specific so that the defendant is able to determine precisely
what to do or refrain from doing, to comply with the order. It must also be
amenable to enforcement by execution or punishment for contempt of court."
When a court is asked to put a stop to the violation of socio-economic rights
and prevent its recurrence, it is often not possible or appropriate to make such a
specific order once and for all. The reasons are as follows: The pattern of
violation may be too widespread, systemic and diffuse to put a stop to it by a
single court order. For example, unfair race discrimination, which still prevails
with regard to the provision of social services, cannot be rectified overnight.
The same applies in many other situations where for example, the
overcrowding of our prisons probably constitutes a violation of the prisoner's
rights under sections 12(1)(e) and 35(2)(e) of the Constitution. The prisoners are
35 Chaskalson PinS v Lawrence 1997 (10) BCLR 1348 (CC) observed that the court has a broad
range of remedial options, but what it cannot do is legislate, at para 80.
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entitled to conditions of detention that are consistent with human dignity. Where
their rights are violated, the only 'once-and-for-all' remedy that will put a stop
to the violation will be to release as many prisoners as possible. However, such
action would be manifestly inappropriate.V
Violations of this kind must be remedied in other ways. To have any effect
at all, a court order should be directed at the reform of the institution itself rather
than only at the specific violation. In addition, the choice of means should, in
the first place, be the prerogative of the legislative and executive branches of the
government. Only if they make the wrong choices, would it be appropriate for
the judicial branch to interfere with this prerogativer"
In my view, the way to stop widespread violations of socio-economic rights
is for the court to order the government to bring about far-reaching institutional
and structural reform over a period of time in a manner to be determine by the
legislative and executive branches of the government. It requires a "hands on"
approach.
This sounds like a lot of work for our courts and they are unlikely to warm
to this task easily. However, it should be recalled that the courts remain
responsible for the ultimate protection of the violations and enforcement of
constitutional rights. They cannot abdicate their responsibility simply because
conventional remedies are not suitable to cure the violation of a right.
The main steps in the type of structural relief advocated in this part are the
following:
• the court issues an order that identifies the violation and broadly defines
the reform that has to be brought, having regard to the provisions and
objectives of applicable legislation.
• the court calls upon the responsible state official to present a more
detailed plan of reform that would put an end to the violation by
achieving the identified statutory objectives. In other words, the
government agency is given the opportunity to choose the means of
36 Budlender, G. "Facing the Challenges oflmplementation" (1999) 1ESR Review at 16.
37 Trengove (note 18 above).
38 Ibid.
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compliance. The plan will usually have to set a series of deadlines by
which clearly identified milestones have to be reached.
• the government's plan is presented to the court for scrutiny. The
complainant and all other interested parties are given the opportunity to
comment on the plan and to advance alternative suggestions.
• the court settles the plan of reform in the light of all the submissions
made to it. In doing so, it generally defers to the state's choice of means
unless it is irrational, not bona fide or in some other way clearly
inadequate.
• the court issues an order directing the defendant to implement the
finalised plan. lts order directs the defendant to report back to the court
on the implementation of the plan after the period allowed for
implementation or, where appropriate, after each of the deadlines set for
the achievement of the pre-determined milestones.
• the court appoints an independent person to monitor the implementation
of the plan and report back to it on the return day. The monitoring
institution such as the SAHRC has a constitutional obligation of
ensuring the effective implementation of the rights. Therefore, being
appointed by the court to ensure compliance is a step forward towards
realising the rights. The NGOs cannot be left out of the process as they
have to co-ordinate efforts with the court and the SAHRC to bring about
the meaningful implementation of all the rights in the Constitution
including socio-economic rights.
• when the matter returns to court, the government is called to account for
its implementation of the plan. The applicants, the court appointed
monitor and all other interested parties are also heard. If the hearings
reveal unforeseen difficulties or inadequacies in the plan, suitable
adjustments are made, new orders are issued and the process repeated
until the reform is achieved.Ï' This of course envisages that the court
provides, at the outset, that its order will be amended to cater for the
unforeseen circumstances.
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A structural interdict of this kind works well if the state agency is co-operative
and the court is willing to supervise. When the responsible state agency does not
want to co-operate by preparing a plan, a court may have no option but to write
its own plan, if needs be, with the aid of other interested parties and court
appointed experts. This will involve the judiciary in the making of policy
choices that are ordinarily in the legislative and executive domain. But that is
sometimes the only way to ensure the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights. If the state agency is dragging its feet or simply refuses to
comply with the court order, as it has done in Grootboom, the court may call
upon the national government to intervene. This is of course only possible if the
state agency is in the provincial sphere" or in the local sphere of government."
A government official may also be held responsible for contempt of court and a
fine that is sufficient to exact compliance may be imposed. As a last resort, the
responsible state official may be imprisoned to compel co-operation.
4.2.5 Comment
While the first three remedies mentioned above are still imaginable in a country
such as India that has an activist judiciary, it must be acknowledged that South
African courts are highly unlikely to ever impose them. Our courts have
39 Ibid.
40 See section 100 of the Constitution.
41 Previously, section 100 merely empowered the national government to intervene in a
province that fails to fulfil an obligation imposed on it in terms of the constitution, the
government does not have the same power to intervene in a municipality. The national
executive's obligation to direct the taking of steps to meet its obligations or to assume
responsibility for the relevant obligation in order to maintain national standards or to prevent an
unreasonable action is therefore restricted to provinces. As a result, there is at present very little
the national can do if a municipality defaults on its obligations with regard to some functional
areas such as water and electricity supply systems, apart from facilitating national institutions to
assume responsibility.
This is out of line with other provisions of the Constitution that depict the three spheres
of government as distinctive; interdependent and interrelated. To the extent that the
constitutional relationship between the three spheres are generally direct and not hierarchical,
the section must be seen as a constitutional anomaly that should be corrected by extending the
power to intervene in municipalities to the national government as well.
Because the greatest interaction between the government and the people takes place
through the local government, the section was amended to give national executive the same
power to intervene in a non-complying municipality as section 139 confers on provinces The
amendment will enable the government to meet its obligation with regard to the implementation
of socio-economic rights more effectively and probably limit the number of Constitutional Court
cases needed to implement socio-economic rights.
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however shown some interest in the structural interdict. If this remedy is applied
meticulously in the ways suggested above, it could go a long way towards
addressing the discrepancy that exists between the promotion of civil rights on
the one hand and socio-economic rights on the other.
4.3 APPROACH OF THE SOUTHAFRICAN COURTS
The development of case law dealing with socio-economic rights has started to
gain momentum in South Africa. This section critically analyses the existing
jurisprudence in this regard.
4.3.1 Refusal to Adjudicate
The Constitutional Court (and other courts) could for a number of reasons refuse
to entertain an application and so avoid having to deal with the difficult question
of enforcement raised by these challenges. While adherence to the doctrine of
the separation of powers is commendable, the injudicious refusal to adjudicate
in socio-economic matters could jeopardise the realisation of these rights.
4.3.1.1Mkangeli and Others v Joubert and Others42
This case dealt with an application for leave to appeal directly to the
Constitutional Court against a decision of the Witwatersrand High Court. While
it did not directly deal with the protection of socio-economic rights, the High
Court's judgment clearly had implications for the enforcement of socio-
economic rights.
The applicants had initially occupied a piece of land unlawfully and had
been accused of causing a nuisance. An order was then granted by the High
Court for them to vacate the land and abate the nuisance. In terms of the order,
the structures in which they were living were to be broken down and, if they
failed to leave the property, they were to be ejected by the sheriff. In the course
of reaching his decision, Flemming DJP commented on the constitutionality of
422001 (4) BCLR 316 CC.
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the provisions of the Tenure Act. Although the provisions of section 172(1)
require that a Court when deciding a constitutional matter within its jurisdiction
"must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution
is invalid to the extent of its inconsistency", and Flemming DIP reached the
view that the provisions of the Tenure Act were inconsistent with the
Constitution, he did not declare them to be unconstitutional.
On appeal, Chaskalson P remarked that appeals are brought against
orders made by a court and not against comments made in the course of a
judgement. The Constitutional Court therefore refused to grant leave to appeal
directly to it, missing an opportunity to break away from a purely legalistic
approach to socio-economic issues.
4.3.1.2 Discussion
The High Court failed to acknowledge that it was dealing with two opposing
fundamental interests. On the one hand, there was the traditional right inherent
in ownership reserving exclusive use and protection of the property to the
landowner. On the other hand, there was the genuine despair of South African
citizens who were in dire need of adequate accommodation. The court's duty
was to balance these opposing interests and bring out a decision that was "just
and equitable". The Constitutional Court's "judicious avoidance'Y to address
the issue indicates a reluctance to adjudicate on these matters.
As in South Africa, the framing of the Indian Constitution occurred in
the context of massive socio-economic deprivation of the majority of Indian
citizens. Its genesis lies in the directive principles requiring the state to secure a
social order that promotes welfare and raises the standard of living. In contrast
with South Africa, however, the Indian jurisprudence is abound with orders to
the government to fulfil its obligations. Judges are spearheading what is called
social action or public interest litigation, which is aimed at making justice
accessible to those who are denied their constitutional rights and enabling them
to use the courts to force the government to fulfil its commitments. This is
happening despite the fact that socio-economic rights are contained in non-
43 Ian Currie "Judicious Avoidance" (1999) 15 SAJHR at 139.
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justiciable directive principles of state policy and therefore do not have the same
status as socio-economic rights in the South African Constitution, where they
are entrenched in the Constitution. Despite criticisms that the courts are taking
over the functions of the administration and involving themselves in policy
determination, which is the executive's domain, the judiciary remains
committed to principles of social justice."
The Indian Court has been willing to protect and promote socio-
economic rights on different levels. They have extended protection for existing
rights, enforced measures adopted by the state and required active fulfilment of
rights in certain cases. Although the first duty in fulfilling socio-economic rights
vests with the government rather than with the court, this does not preclude the
courts from articulating constitutional values and corresponding obligations at
this level.
For example, in State of Himachal Pradesh and Another v Umed Ram
Sharman and Others,45 the applicants applied for an order to force the state to
complete the construction of a road to their village. The authorities had already
sanctioned the building of the road, some money had been allocated for the task
and the building was in progress when the work suddenly stopped. After hearing
expert evidence the order was granted against the Department of Public-Works
to proceed with the construction of the 5km stretch of the road to the applicant's
village.
The court went further to direct the superintendent engineer to make an
application to the state government for an additional sum of 50000 rupees to be
allocated for the project and directed the government to consider the demand
seriously.l" The engineer was also ordered to report back to the High Court on
the progress made on the bridge. The appeal to the Supreme Court was
dismissed and the court held that the applicants were personally affected by the
absence of the road because they were poor harijans and their access to
44 De Vos (note 7 above) at 69.
45 AIR (1986) SC 847 cited and discussed by De Vos (note 7 above) at 89-90.
46 Ibid at 850 at para 8.
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communication, as well as to life outside the village, was obstructed and
prevented by the absence of the road.47
The court therefore held that there was a constitutional duty on the state
as far as is feasible and possible, to provide roads for communication to
residents in hilly areas.48 In deciding whether the court had not exceeded its
powers, the Supreme Court stressed that the applicants had in effect asked the
courts to review the administrative inaction of the state and to determine the
urgency of such access to the right in question. Although the court concluded
that it had always been relatively easy to review an administrative action in
terms of an existing state policy, it acknowledged that to review administrative
inaction or the lack of state policy was far more difficult in practice and most
courts would be loath to go this far. Judicial review of administrative inaction
therefore had to be approached with caution and not in haste." Eventually,
however, the court not only reviewed the administrative inaction, but ordered
the state to act positively and made provision for itself to monitor the progress
of the state's action in fulfilling its obligation.
In Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation/" an appeal, which was
brought by pavement dwellers against the state who had been granted an order
to remove them, the court found that, although an infringement of the right to
livelihood had occurred, it had been justifiable in the circumstances. However,
the court insisted that the pavement dwellers could be removed only on certain
stringent conditions. They had to be provided with alternative sites for
resettlement and those who had lived on the pavement for more than twenty
years could not be removed unless the land was needed for a public purpose."
The Supreme Court therefore ensured that justice was not miscarried at the
expense of the desperate.
In the light of these decisions, the Indian experience warrants closer
scrutiny by South African courts. As the Indian courts have shown, the courts
can and should exact some pressure on the government for the promotion of
47 At para 10.
48 At para 11.
49 Ibid 854 at para 27.
50 AIR (1987) LRC 351.
51 Ibid at 369 B- C.
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socio-economic rights. By dismissing the application of Mkangeli out of hand,
the court has failed to rise to this task.
4.3.2 Resource Constraints
While the High Court adopted a seemingly progressive approach in Van Biljon v
Minister of Correctional Services and Others, 52 the Constitutional Court
adopted a much more conservative approach in Soobramoney v Minister of
Health, KwaZulu-Natal.53 In both cases the issue of budgetary constraints
figured prominently. However the outcome of the two cases differed radically.
Van Biljon won his case and Soobramoney lost. The reasons provided for the
different results are instructive.
4.3.2.1 Van Biljon v Minister of Correctional Services and Others
In this case the applicants were four prisoners diagnosed as HIV positive.
Medication had been prescribed to them but had not been provided. Relying on
the provisions of section 35(2)(e) of the Constitution, they sought an order
directing the state to provide the prescribed treatment at state expense. The state
raised the issue of budgetary constraints. It was argued on behalf of the
Department of Correctional Services ("the Department") that the question of
what is "adequate medical treatment" for prisoners had to be determined
according to what is provided for patients outside prison at state expense. For
this reason, it was contended that HIV positive prisoners are not entitled to
better treatment than HIV positive patients outside prison. Itwas further argued
that if the prisoner were to receive anti-viral combination therapy, this would
result in a prioritisation of resources in their favour. In light of budgetary
limitations on hospital services, such prioritisation would be at the expense of
other patients dependent upon the provision of health care by the state.i"
52 1997 (4) SA 441 (C).
53 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC).
54 The relevant part of section 35(2)(e) provides as follows: Everyone who is detained, including
every sentenced prisoner, has the right to conditions of detention that are consistent with human
dignity, including at least exercise and the provision, at state expense, of adequate
accommodation, nutrition, reading material and medical treatment.
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Responding to this argument, the Brand J held that a lack of funds in
principle could not be the answer to a prisoner's constitutional claim to adequate
medical treatment. The crucial point was that adequate medical treatment must
be determined according to what the state could afford in a particular case, and
not in a vacuum. 55 If the state had based its case on budgetary constraints, that
is, if they had argued that they could not afford a particular form of medical
treatment to particular individuals or that a particular form of medical treatment
to a person would place an unwarranted burden on the state, the Court might
have decided that treatment which is affordable to the state be accepted as
adequate medical treatment. 56 However, as it turned out the Correctional
Services Department could not show that it could not afford the anti-viral
treatment to the two HIV positive prisoners. There was therefore no reason not
to order the Department to provide the treatment prescribed to them by the
medical doctors.
Section 36(1), the limitation clause, was also irrelevant. This section
provides that a right may be limited only in terms of the law of general
application that is reasonable and justifiable in a democratic society, taking into
account all relevant factors. The implication is that the only basis on which a
qualifier such as "within available resources" may limit section 35(2)(e) would
be if it was incorporated into a law of general application. No such case was
made by the Department. 57
Responding to the argument that the rights of prisoners are stronger than
the rights of people outside prison, Brand J held that with regard to basic needs,
such as accommodation and medical care, the Constitution itself draws a
distinction between prisoners and people outside prison. Standards applying
outside prison cannot necessarily be used to determine what is adequate for
prisoners as required by section 35(2)(e). It is an unfortunate fact of life that
there are so many people in this country whose accommodation cannot be
described as adequate by any standard. What is provided for people outside
prison can therefore not be an absolute standard for prisonera." Unlike the
55 Van Biljon at paras 43-46.
56 Ibid at para 49.
57 At para 60.
58 At para 52.
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people outside prison, prisoners have no recourse to other resources to assist
them in gaining access to medical treatment. And because of the over-crowded
conditions in which prisoners are accommodated, they are more susceptible to
opportunistic diseases than people outside prison.
In respect of accommodation, nutrition, and medical treatment,
therefore, section 35(2)(e) guarantees to every prisoner a direct right at state
expense to the provision of medical treatment. This right is not contingent upon
or affected by the provisions of sections 26 and 27 of the Bill of Rights, which
entitle everyone progressively within the available resources of the state, to
access housing, food, health care services and the like. In other words, if there is
a distinction between persons inside and those outside prison, the Constitution
itself draws that distinction.
The Van Biljon decision did not mean that prisoners always had to be
treated better than persons outside prison. Brand J explicitly said that he was
prepared to accept limitations of the level of medical treatment provided to
prisoners and that the degree of such a limitation would depend on the
availability of resources. Had the state proved that it had inadequate means, the
term 'adequate' in section 35(2)(e) provides a vehicle for limiting the type of
treatment available to prisoners. The failure to demonstrate inadequacy of
resources caused the Department to be the author of its own misfortune.
However, the court established that, while budgetary constraints could be seen
as part of the definition of adequacy, the onus to prove the unavailability of
funds is on the state. This decision allays fears that the burden rests on the
applicant, and is therefore a progressive judgement in terms of socio-economic
rights.
The aftermath of the Van Biljon case illustrates the central concern addressed in
this study. Progressive orders without an effective system to ensure compliance
may not be enough. Nobody had been appointed to supervise the order. Because
of the respondent's arguments of the scarcity of resources, the treatment was
provided only in the first few months after the order was granted. After this
time, the applicants were given only vitamins.i" No supervision occurred. The
59 Telephonic Interview with Judge Fagan on 18 October 2001.
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Human Rights Commission was not involved in this case. Ultimately, therefore,
the lawyers involved and the court again failed the people of this country by
failing to ensure the monitoring of the court order after giving an interdict. As
the Commission was not involved in this case the court should have involved it
to ensure the proper implementation of this order.
The Legal Resources Centre is also partly to blame for failing to monitor
the order. It had represented the applicants in the matter. At the moment, the
Centre is unaware whether the prisoners are still given the treatment or even
whether they are still alive. Apparently, one of them was released.6o As an NGO
committed to the protection and promotion of human rights, they should ensure
that their victories are honoured by the state. As it has been mentioned that there
has been a huge cry for NGOs to be involved in promoting socio-economic
rights, but when the very same NGO who challenged the inaction of the
government in realising these rights fail to follow-up a court's decision to
ensure meaningful implementation of the order, it raises concerns. The fact that
the victims have not complained about the meaningful implementation of the
order also encourages the non-committal of the government in honouring its
obligations.
4.3.2.2 Soobramoney v Minister of Health
The constitutional provision, section 27, which was dealt with in the case of
Soobramoney" relates to health care services and stipulates that:
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to:
(a) health care services, including reproductive health care;
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within
its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of these
rights.
(3) No one may be refused emergency medical treatment.
In Soobramoney the applicant relied specifically on section 27(3) as well as the
section 11 provision on the right to life. He was a 41-year-old diabetic man
60 Telephonic Interview with Mr William Crawford, "Legal Resources Centre" Cape Town on
20 November 2001.
61 Soobramoney (note 43 above).
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suffering from ischemic heart disease and cerebro-vascular disease. At the time
of his appeal he was judged to be in the final stages of chronic renal failure.
However, his life could be prolonged by regular renal dialysis, which he was
seeking from Addington Hospital in Durban. In terms of its policy on the
provision of the dialysis treatment, the hospital denied him access to the
machines. As it had only 20 machines, there were not enough for all the patients
suffering from chronic renal failure. Hence those whose condition was
irreversible and who were not eligible for a kidney transplant were denied
access to them in order that the patients who could use them be kept alive while
waiting for a kidney transplant.
The Constitutional Court dismissed the right to life challenge on the
basis that the right to life does not justify a claim to the provision of life-
sustaining medical care.62 The court acknowledged that Indian jurisprudence
contains valuable insights on the interpretation of the right to life especially on
the subject of positive obligations on the state to respect the basic needs of its
inhabitants. However, it went on to distinguish the Indian Constitution from the
South African one and held that:
"Unlike the Indian Constitution ours deals specifically in the Bill of
Rights with certain positive obligations imposed on the state and, where
it does so, it is our duty to apply the obligations as formulated in the
Constitution and not to draw inferences that would be inconsistent
therewith. ,,63
Therefore, since the right to medical treatment is dealt with pertinently in the
Constitution, it does not have to be inferred from the right to life. The result of
the Court's reasoning is that the inclusion of socio-economic rights in the South
African Constitution detracts from the positive duties on the state that may be
derived from the right to life. In short, the right to life may mean less in South
Africa than in India because we have chosen to entrench socio-economic rights
in our Constitution. This cannot be accepted. The proper manner of dealing with
the right to life challenge was to ask whether an order in Soobramoney' s favour
would endanger the lives of others, as one does when justifying the killing of a
62 Moellendorf D "Reasoning About Resources: Soobramoney and the Future of Socio-
Economic Rights Claims" (1998) 14 SAJHR at 327.
63 Soobramoney at 772 E-F.
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person in self-defence or while making an arrest. If a place for Soobramoney on
the machines meant danger to the life of another the challenge was correctly
dismissed. However, as I shall argue below, the state failed to demonstrate this.
As far as the challenge based on section 27(3) is concerned, which
contains the emergency medical treatment provision, Chaskalson P argued that:
"The words "emergency medical treatment" may possibly be open to a
broad construction which would include ongoing treatment of chronic
illness for the purpose of prolonging life. But this is not the ordinary
meaning, and if this had been the purpose which section 27(3) was
intended to serve, one would have expected that to have been expressed
in positive and specific terms.,,64
He added that:
"The purpose of the rights seems to ensure that the treatment be given in
an emergency and is not frustrated by reason of bureaucratic
requirements or other formalities't'"
As the appellant needed ongoing dialysis treatment, the Court held that it did
not qualify as an emergency and that section 27(3) was therefore not applicable.
In contrast to Brand J's approach who argued that this was not a decision for the
courts but constituted a medical question best answered by medical
professionals, Chaskalson P, as well as Sachs J66 in his concurring judgement,
engaged with the question of what the term "emergency medical treatment"
might mean.
The Court then proceeded to determine the issue in accordance with the
provisions of section 27(1) and (2).67 These provisions entitle everyone to
access to health care services provided by the state within its available
resources. Both Chaskalson Pand Madala J proceeded to highlight the
budgetary constraints experienced by the Department of Health in KwaZulu-
64 Ibid at para 13.
65 Soobramoney at para 20.
66 Sachs J explained the limited sense of emergency medical treatment in the following manner:
"The special attention given by section 27(3) to non-refusal of emergency medical treatment
relates to the particular sense of shock to our notions of human solidarity occasioned by the
turning away from the hospital of people battered and bleeding and those who fall victim to
sudden unexpected collapse. It provides reassurance to all members of society that accident and
emergency departments will be available to deal with unforeseeable catastrophes which could
befall any person, anywhere and at any time." At para 51.
67 Ibid at para 22.
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Natal, and held that it hardly had enough funds to cover the cost of the basic
services, which it was providing to the public."
Chaskalson P continued to give a breakdown of how the Department had
consistently overspent its budget for the two preceding years and how that was
most likely to continue unless serious cutbacks were made in the service that the
Department provided." On the question of courts making decisions that have
budgetary implications, he added that:
"The provincial administration which is responsible for health services
in KwaZulu-Natal has to make decisions about funding to be available
for health care and how such funds should be spent. These choices
involve difficult decisions to be taken at the political level in fixing the
health budget, and at the functional level in deciding upon the priorities
to be met. A Court will be slow to interfere with rational decisions taken
in good faith by the political organs and medical authorities whose
responsibility is to deal with such matters.,,70
I have two problems with this type of reasoning. The first is that when
someone's life is at stake it is inappropriate for a court to defer to choices of
majoritarian branches. Instead, a court should employ strict scrutiny. Let me
illustrate by way of an example. The health authorities in KwaZulu-Natal
claimed that they were treating 85 patients with the 20 machines at their
disposal, which was 25 more than the ideal of 60 patients. However, on my
rough calculations the authorities should have been able to treat many more than
85 patients with the 20 machines. Most patients require to be treated twice a
week. Now, if each machine was capable of treating four patients a day (four
hours for treating and two hours for cleaning), as appears from the judgment,
the authorities could accommodate a maximum of 280 patients (20 times 4
times 7 divided by 2) and not 85. At the very least, this type of question should
have been asked. The Court should have demanded an explanation as to why the
authorities were incapable of accommodating one more person.
My second problem is that the tone of Soobramoney is a far cry from the
sentiments expressed in the Certification judgement where the court readily
accepted that it might be required to make judgements that would require a
68 See pages 774-776 at paras 24-28 and 779 at para 43.
69774 at para 24.
70776 at para 29.
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change in fiscal priorities when enforcing civil and political rights as well as
socio-economic rights. In that judgement, it would seem that the court's role in
upholding socio-economic rights was not limited to the framework of existing
national and provincial budgetary allocations. At the time, the fact that the court
rejected the objections against inclusion of these rights in the Constitution sent a
message that the court would give judgements that would move beyond the
rigid confines imposed by the scarcity of resources. Unfortunately the Court
failed to stick to this promise.
Moellendorf has persuasively argued that the court has adopted a narrow
interpretation of available resources, where "narrow" can be equated with the
budgetary allocations made by a particular state department" for the protection
of a right. A broad interpretation of the word "resources" has to be equated with
the real resources of a state.
In Canada, unreasonable delays in the case of an accused person
awaiting trial have resulted in the court's ordering the state to increase capacity
of the judicial system by building new Courtrooms and hiring extra judges and
staff. In R v AskoV72 a delay of up to two years between the date of committal
for trial and the trial itself was held to be in violation of the accused's right to be
tried within a reasonable time as guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms. Recognising the systematic problem in the judicial system, the
Supreme Court of Canada was aware that its decisions could have fiscal
implications, but nonetheless suggested several ways in which the costs could
be minimised, such as adapting government buildings or portable structures to
serve as court houses. It further stated that if such temporary measures proved
unworkable, some other solutions would be required."
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A precedent therefore exists in which a court has ordered the state to
marshal any resources at its disposal to protect the right to a fair trial even if it
meant cutting down on salary increases for highly paid judges or decreasing
71 Moellendorf(note 52 above) at 330.
72 19902 SCR 1199, 1203-07, 1247 (Canada) cited in Essop F. "Enforceability ofSocio-
Economic Rights with Special Reference to Housing" LLM Thesis, University of Cape Town
(1999) at 37.
73 Ibid at 1243.
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capital expenditure used for building new court rooms.Ï" Had the court in
Soobramoney therefore adopted a broad interpretation of available resources, it
might have ordered the state to marshal its resources in any reasonable way, for
example, by cutting down on money paid to consultants or by reducing
outrageous car allowances. However, Madala J alarmingly expresses its narrow
interpretation in his concurring judgement:
"Some rights in the Constitution are the ideal and something to be
strived for. They amount to a promise, in some cases, and an indication
of what a democratic society aiming to salvage lost dignity, freedom and
equality should embark upon. They are values which the Constitution
seeks to provide, nurture and protect for a future South Africa." 75
In the light of the fact that a hard battle was fought to entrench socio-economic
rights in the Constitution and to grant them the same status as civil and political
rights, the view of socio-economic rights as "ideals and something to be strived
for" is disturbing. Not only is the view reminiscent of the arguments that were
used against the entrenchment of these rights, but it also fails to distinguish
between rights and policy goals or priorities. As the protection of these rights is
a necessary condition for meaningful political participation, the view also
diminishes the value of civil and political rights. As they become the
prerogative of the privileged, and socio-economic rights are relegated to a
second-class position, the promise of democracy fades.
4.3.2.3 Discussion
A closer analysis show the following similarities and differences between
Soobramoneyand Van Biljon:
• in both cases an order was sought for the provision of expensive medical
treatment and, in both cases, it was sought at state expense.
• the applicants in both cases relied on the provisions of the Bill of Rights.
• in both cases the state raised the defence of the lack of funds.
741bid.
75 Soobramoney at para 42.
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• while the medical treatment sought in both cases would have extended
the patient's life expectancy and enhanced the quality of life, it would
not have brought about a cure.
In the light of these similarities, it is odd that the courts came to opposing
conclusions, which brings us to the differences between the two cases. The first
is that the applicants in Van Biljon were prisoners, while the applicant in
Soobramoney was an ordinary citizen. This leads to the next dissimilarity. The
status of the prisoners allowed them to rely on the unqualified right to medical
care, which is different from the right relied upon by Soobramoney. Section
35(2)(e), which entitles prisoners to adequate medical treatment, is neither
qualified by phrases such as "within the available resources" nor by the
progressive realisation of these rights as in the case of section 27. This explains
why the state could use the argument of a lack of resources in Soobramoney, but
it could not do so in Van Biljon. A limitation of the right to health care was also
built into the section providing for the right to medical care in Soobramoney.
Once the court was persuaded that the state did not have unlimited resources
and that its budget allocations and applications were rational, that was the end of
the matter.
In Van Biljon, however, the state would have had to convince the court
under section 36 of the Constitution that it was authorised by the law of general
application to limit the right to adequate medical treatment. Nothing in the
judgement suggests that the Department had even considered the burden that
faced it, let alone justifying the limitation of the right. 76 By reading sections
27(1) and 2 together the Court in Soobramoney did not require the government
to justify the violation of the right by clearly demonstrating a lack of resources.
76 In fact, the court came to its partial rescue by intimating that it was
prepared to consider budgetary constraints to which the department was
subjected. In the words of Brand J:
"I do not agree with the proposition that budgetary constraints are irrelevant in the present
context. What is adequate medical treatment cannot be determined in vacuo. In determining
what is adequate regard must be held to, inter alia, what the state can afford. The point is that
the state would have had to show that it was entitled in terms of the general law of application to
use budgetary constraints as an argument for the limitation of the applicant's right. Such law of
general application could either be the right of other, or some form of statutory measure." See
Van Biljon at para 49.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Instead, the availability of resources became an inherent limitation of the socio-
economic right. As explained by Sachs J in Soobramoney:
"The traditional right analyses have to be adapted so as to take into
account of the special problems created by the need to provide a broad
framework of constitutional principles governing the right of access to
scarce resources and to adjudicate between competing rights bearers.
When the rights by their very nature are shared and interdependent,
striking appropriate balances between the equally valid entitlements of a
multitude of claimants should not be seen as imposing limits on those
rights (which would then have to be justified in terms of section 36), but
defining the circumstances in which the rights may most fairly and
effectively be enjoyed.?"
Resource constraints should not a fortiori exclude the need for justifying a
failure to realise a socio-economic right. The approach of the Constitutional
Court in Soobramoney detracts from the function of socio-economic rights as
imposing a duty to justify a failure to realise socio-economic rights. If the
reason for failure is a lack of resources, this should be clearly demonstrated by
government.
4.3.3 Absence of Monitoring
After the disappointment of the Soobramoney case, the decision in the
Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and
Others78 became a critical judgement with regard to future litigation in the area
of socio-economic rights. It provided another, and much better opportunity for
the court and the South African Human Rights Commission to exercise their
functions properly to ensure the proper realisation of these rights.
4.3.3.1 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v
Grootboom and Others
The government challenged the correctness of the High Court decision that
ordered the government to provide the respondents, who were children, and
their parents with adequate basic shelter or housing until they could obtain
77 Soobramoney at para 54.
78 See (note 6 above).
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permanent accommodation. The High Court held that the applicants failed to
make a case on the basis of right of access to adequate housing under section 26,
but found that there was a violation of section 28(1)( c). The decision therefore
clearly recognised that the state has a positive duty to provide shelter to children
whose parents are unable to do so and that it is in the best interests of children to
be accommodated with their parents.
The High Court also confirmed unequivocally that the question of
budgetary constraints was not a determinative when analysing an alleged breach
of section 28( 1)(c). In an argument reminiscent of the reasoning employed in
Van Biljon, the High Court held that section 26 complements the unqualified
rights of children to shelter entrenched in section 28(1)(c). However, in the
process the High Court failed to deal with the argument that section 26 imposes
certain minimum duties, as argued by the Legal Resources Centre and the
Community Law Centre at the University of the Western Cape.
The Constitutional Court allowed the appeal in part and substituted for
the order of the High Court an order declaring that section 26(2) of the
Constitution required the state to devise and implement within its available
resources a comprehensive and co-ordinated programme to realise progressively
the right of access to adequate housing. It also declared that the housing
programme in the area had fallen short of the standard required in that it failed
to make provision emergency measures to accommodate those who had no
access to land, no roof over their heads and who were living in intolerable
conditions. A programme aimed at providing relief to such people had to
include measures such as, but not necessarily limited to, those contemplated in
the Cape Metro Housing Programme or Accelerated Managed Land Settlement
Programme.
In addition, it ruled that the High Court had erred in deciding the case on
the basis of section 28(1)(C).79 Instead it held that section 26 included a duty on
the state to provide emergency housing relief for those in desperate need. The
Constitutional Court confirmed that the Bill of Rights is a transformative
79 Grootboom at para 74.
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document aimed at achieving a society where people will be able to live their
lives in dignity, freedom from poverty, diseases and hunger.Ï"
Finally, the Constitutional Court reminded the South African Human
Rights Commission that it had to monitor and assess the observance of human
rights in the Republic in terms of section 184(1)(c), of which subsections 2(a)
and (b) afford it the power to investigate and to report on the observance of
human rights and to take steps to secure appropriate redress where human rights
have been violated. The court also specifically mentioned the Commission's
task to monitor and report on the compliance by the state of its section 26
obligations.
4.3.3.2 Discussion
Despite being a landmark decision, the judgement in this case is flawed in some
respects. The court indicated unambiguously that it would not prescribe any
particular policy option for giving effect to socio-economic rights. Instead it
recognised that there is a wide range of measures that could be adopted by the
state to meet its obligations. These measures may also be reviewed by the court
against the standard of reasonableness imposed by the sections protecting socio-
economic rights."
This judgement failed to give guidelines on which state organ is
responsible for socio-economic delivery. Among those who were not informed
of the judgement was the mayor of the area concemed.F who got to know about
the judgement only when notified by the SAHRC. The court also did not give
the Commission guidelines on what to monitor and did not provide time frames
for a report back on progress even though the SAHRC was an amicus curiae
party to the litigation. Also, the court did not consider that the Commission does
not have sufficient resources (human and financial) to monitor without financial
assistance. The lack of sufficient pressure to ensure that the order be monitored
effectively, allowed inefficient administrators, who were supposed to
80 De Vos P "Grootboom, The Right of Access to Housing and Substantive Equality as
Contextual Faimess"(2001) 17 SAJHR 258 at 256.
81 Grootboom at para 41.
82 Interview with Mr Victor Southwell (SAHRC) March 2001 Cape Town.
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communicate the order to all those involved in the delivery of services, to delay
the implementation of the order.
In the final analysis nothing much has improved for the homeless and
destituted in the Cape Metropole, although the judgement was handed down in
October 2000. People are still living in appalling conditions.f The Grootboom
community themselves were supposed to benefit from a settlement in terms of
which land and temporary facilities were to be provided for them. Even though
this settlement was made an order of court, it was not properly implemented.
For these reasons, I believe that the outcome of the Grootboom case is in
many ways unsatisfactory, especially when one contrasts the outcome with what
has been achieved by the Court in other areas of fundamental rights litigation.
The case of August", which dealt with the right to vote rather than socio-
economic rights, provides a good example in which the Constitutional Court,
following a breach of fundamental rights, gave clear directions for the
implementation of its order to the Electoral Commission to make arrangements
for the prisoners to register and once registered to vote in the elections. In this
case, the Electoral Commission was required to furnish an affidavit setting out
the manner in which the order would be complied with and to serve a copy of
the affidavit to the attorneys for the applicants and on the Registrar of the
Constitutional Court. In the light of the urgency of the matter, a period of two
weeks was given for the Commission to prepare the affidavit. 85 The court
therefore exercised its supervisory jurisdiction in this instance to ensure the
proper implementation of the order.
It is also interesting to note the emphasis on the effective remedies in the
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 86
and Hoffman v South African Airwayi7 cases. In the latter an order was granted
for the instatement of a person who was denied employment because of his
HIV -positive status. The court held that the instatement was a basic element of
the appropriate relief in the case of a prospective employee who is denied
83 Special Assignment (SABC 3) 03 June 2001.
84 August v Electoral Commission 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC).
85 Ibid at para 42.
862000 (1) BCLR 39 (CC) at para 65.
872000 (Il) BCLR 1211 (CC).
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employment for unconstitutional reasons.t" The court did not only give the
remedy but ensured that it monitored compliance that resulted in the instatement
of the applicant.
Therefore, if the Grootboom order had determined precisely what the
state had to do to comply with the order, the destitute would have been
accommodated by now. It is not clear why the Court has been able to give
detailed guidelines and supervised the implementation of the court orders in
respect of civil and political rights, but has failed to do the same with regard to
socio-economic rights.
A much better order was given, albeit by the High Court, in Strydom v
Minister of Correctional Services.89 Again concrete guidelines were laid down
regarding the effective implementation of the court order. The High Court held
that the failure of the Department of Correctional Services to supply electricity
to some parts of the Johannesburg Maximum Security Prison was inconsistent
with the right to conditions of detention that are also consistent with human
dignity. The prison authorities were ordered to report by affidavit to the court
within one month of the order, setting out the timetable for the upgrading of the
electrical system. The court held that this form of interdict was appropriate
where a respondent refuses to commit him / herself to a date by which he / she
will perform an enforceable undertaking.Ï"
Although the Strydom judgement has not been implemented fully yet, at
least there are moves by the government to take the prisoners to an upgraded
prison in Kokstad." The court has also been persistent and made sure that the
order is fully implemented. The commitment of the government cannot be
questioned and the court's willingness to monitor the order must be
commended, but the delay in implementing the order raises some concerns.
None of the judgments involved NGOs (Legal Resources Centre and the
Community Law Centre, University of the Western Cape), even though many of
these NGOs were before the courts, participating in the litigation as amici
curiae. The SAHRC also refrained from involving them. It appears that ifNGOs
88 Ibid at para 51.
891999 (3) BCLR 342 (W).
90 Ibid at para 356 A-B.
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are to be used effectively, the court must involve them in the process in a
practical way by guiding the SAHRC.
Itmust also be said that the NGOs have not offered their services either.
Considering the hard battle that was fought for the inclusion of socio-economic
rights in the Constitution, and the hard battle again for courts to interpret them
in ways that encourage promotion of socio-economic rights, the attitude of the
NGOs is disappointing. They fought a hard battle challenging the inaction of the
government in realising the rights in question but after getting a progressive
judgement in their favour they failed to finish their task.
4.3.4 The Treatment Action Campaign Case
In Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign92 the Constitutional Court
held that the failure by the government to make nevirapine available in state
hospitals to be used where practicable in order to prevent mother-to-child
transmission of HIV was unreasonable and unconstitutional. The Court held that
the government was obliged to administer nevirapine for the prevention of
mother-to-child transmission of HIV at those hospitals and clinics where testing
and counselling facilities are already in place, at least when in the opinion of the
attending medical practitioner this was medically indicated The woman
concerned had to be be appropriately tested and counselled. Itwas unreasonable
to confine the availability of the drug to the research and training sites (two per
province) in the public health sector.
The result must be applauded. It is an important victory for those
wishing to use courts to enforce socio-economic rights. The question however
remains whether the Grootboom lessons have been learnt? What mechanisms
were put in place to ensure that the Court's order is going to be implemented?
Unfortunately this does not appear to have happened. As I have argued
above, when giving a progressive judgement such as this one, the Court has to
be pro-active by ensuring that the proper structures are in place to ensure
91 Interview (note 59 above).
92 Not yet reported but the judgement was delivered by the Constitutional Court on 5th July 2002
(referred to as the 'TAC' case).
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compliance. The Court therefore did not learn from the Grootboom saga. Again,
no provision was made for monitoring of the implementation of the court order.
The Court simply ordered the government to provide nevirapine. It made no
provision for feedback on the manner in which the government has complied
with the order. This shortcoming may result in the failure to implement the
order by hiding behind excuses such a lack of capacity within the respective
Departments.
The applicant in this case, the Treatment Action Campaign, might not
have the capacity to monitor effective implementation of the court order.
Moreover, even if they detect an unwillingness, a 'dragging of the feet', or a
lack of capacity, no mechanism was provided in terms of which they will be
able to approach the court in order to ensure the effective implementation of the
order. The Community Law Centre, based at the University of the Western
Cape, is apparently monitoring the implementation of the order without being
appointed by the Court.93 Sadly, the SAHRC and these NGOs were not
officially mandated to monitor the implementation of the order.
4.4 CONCLUSION
In Soobramoney the Constitutional Court (wrongly in my view) sanctioned the
policy decision of the Kwazulu-Natal authorities not to provide life-prolonging
treatment to a critically ill patient. The very arguments rejected by the Court in
the Certification case and by the High Court in the the Van Biljon case were
unfortunately accepted. This relegated socio-economic rights to a second-class
position. The court's refusal to grant a certificate for leave to appeal directly to
it in Mkangeli vs Joubert, reinforced this perception. Despite this, the later
decisions (in Grootboom and the Treatment Action Campaign) show that the
Court will intervene in some instances in order to enforce socio-economic
rights. There is certainly a move away from Soobramoney and Mkangeli.
However, where the Court decided to promote socio-economic rights, it
failed to ensure meaningful implementation of its orders. While the court has
93 Telephonic Interview with Prof. Sandra Liebenberg, University of the Western Cape
Community Law Centre, 11 October 2002.
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been able to give detailed guidelines and has supervised the implementation of
its orders in respect of civil and political rights, it has failed to do the same with
regard to socio-economic rights. This failure reduces the status of socio-
economic rights to "an ideal and something to be strived for", as it was stated in
Soobramoney by Madala J.
In addition, the South African Human Rights Commission refrained
from involving NGOs in monitoring the implementation of Court orders. This is
an attitude that is at odds with the sentiments expressed by the former
Chairperson of the Commission. In tum the NGOs have, by and large, refrained
from involving themselves in the monitoring of the implementation of the order.
It has become imperative for all those involved in socio-economic rights to
review their roles in relation to their obligations towards ensuring the effective
implementation of court orders.
It has become apparent that the inclusion of socio-economic rights in the
Bill of Rights does not automatically make government accountable. Legal
strategies seldom produce immediate and concrete socio-economic
transformation. Courts are hesitant to formulate concrete policies on the
redistribution of material resources. However, when a court does so, it is
necessary for the court to carefully provide for the implementation of its orders.
The judges in the Constitutional Court do not seem to have escaped a
stereotypical view of the division of functions between court, legislature and
executive." This has resulted in a failure to seek and create mechanisms
aggresively to ensure implementation of the Court's orders. Once such
mechanisms are put in place, they will allow the Court to operate more
confidently in the socio-economic rights arena.
94 See for example S v Zuma 1995 (4) BCLR 401 SA (CC) where Kentridge AJ said: "while
admitting that general language does not have a single objective meaning, nevertheless warns
that the main task of the judiciary should remain the interpretation of a written instrument and
that a less vigorous approach may entail the dander that the constitution may be taken to mean
whatever one wishes it to mean" at 412 paras (F-G), see also S v Makwanyane 1995 (4) SA 665
(CC) where Kriegler J said: "In answering that question the method to be used are essentially
legal, not moral, or philosophical. The incumbents are judges not sages, their discipline is the
law, not ethics or philosophy and certainly not politics" at 747 F-748 A. For an extensive
discussion on the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court see Cockrell A. "Rainbow
Jurisprudence (1996) 12 SAJHR at 23 where he argues that the judges of the Constitutional
Court had by and large failed to go beyond the formulation of formal reasons for their decisions
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The Court has also not always made use of the more creative foreign
case law, emanating from countries such as India." The body of international
standards developed, amongst others that of the UN Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural rights, can also provide valuable guidance to our courts." If
the courts are to contribute to the alleviation of existing inequalities, a judiciary
with a vision and lawyers with compassion are essential to ensure the proper
execution of the judgements handed down by the court."
and had not engaged in the moral and political reasoning required when making the difficult
decisions about matters of political morality.
95 According to section 39(1)(b) of the final Constitution, the courts or other tribunals "must
consider international law" when interpreting the Bill of Rights. See also Dugard J. "The Role
ofInternational Law in Interpreting the Bill of Rights" (1994) 10 SAJHR 208 at 212.
96 Eide A. Economic. Social and Cultural Rights (1995) at 56.
97 Unfortunately the training of such lawyers has never been a priority at South African law
schools. See Gabriel A. "Socio-Economic Rights in the Bill of Rights: Comparative Lessons
from India" (1997) I Human Rights Constitutional Law Journal of Southern Africa at 8.
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CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter aims at drawing together lines from the study and recommends a
model for improvement. The research question posed was whether court orders
in respect of socio-economic rights are implemented adequately in South Africa.
The answer appears to be unequivocally negative. The responsible institutions
have executed none of the few court orders that have been decided since 1996
effectively. This bodes ill for the implementation of court orders enforcing
socio-economic rights.
5.2 SUMMARY
Although the study is concerned with the realisation of socio-economic rights
through the effective implementation of court orders, it must be noted that the
first duty regarding the implementation of such rights lies with the state. The
court becomes involved only once the state is alleged to have neglected its duty.
In Chapter Two, the processes that have been instituted for the
protection of socio-economic rights were examined in international law and
within the South African context. The purpose was to establish whether there is
a meaningful recognition of these rights in South Africa. Since the country has
emerged from a protracted and violent struggle for the recognition of civil
political and socio-economic rights, it was reasonable to expect that South
Africa would apply special measures for the implementation of all the rights
protected in our Constitution.
It was found that while measures have been adopted in South Africa for
the effective realisation of human rights so that they do not become paper rights,
several problems still exist in the implementation of socio-economic rights.
Firstly, the internal qualifications contained in the provisions dealing with
socio-economic rights mean that there is no absolute entitlement to a minimum
level of social goods free of charge or on demand in South Africa. Except for
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the provision of emergency medical treatment and the prevention of the
demolition of housing or eviction, the Bill of Rights recognises that socio-rights
cannot be realised with immediate effect. In fact, it states explicitly that steps
taken by the state with regard to health care, food, water and social security
must be reasonable, that the state should operate within available resources and
that the rights must be realised progressively.
Secondly, despite South Africa's commitment to protection of human
rights in the international plane, it has failed to ratify the ICESCR to date.
Judging from the international instruments South Africa has ratified, it seems
that more emphasis is placed on civil and political rights than on socio-
economic rights. As mentioned before, this discrepancy undermines South
Africa's commitment to these rights before the international community.
In Chapter Three the monitoring function of the SAHRC and NGOs was
analysed. The purpose was to determine the efficiency of the Commission in the
monitoring process and to establish how NGOs could be involved in process.
Because a democratic state can by its very nature not monitor itself, it is
dependent on such organisations for maintaining its democratic integrity. It was
found that the process of monitoring human rights in this country is still
problematical. Two possibilities exist. The first is monitoring by a state
commission, such as the HRC. The second is monitoring by NGOs.
Neither the Constitution nor the ICESCR involve NGOs with monitoring
of socio-economic rights. The South African Constitution merely contains a
reference to class actions in section 38. In practive NGOs have consistently
been sidelined. As far as the HRC is concerned, the main problems are that its
findings are recommendatory and do not bind the government; It is unable to
order effective remedies and to follow up findings; and its activities lack
publicity and visibility due to the fact that their communications are considered
during private sessions.
The HRC has also made some clear mistakes in the monitoring process.
Denying NGOs' access to reports by government departments is a matter of
grave concern. In addition, the Commission was hampered by a lack of training
of government officials, an overly statistical approach to data collection,
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ineffective distribution of information and a lack of coordination.
The main problem identified in Chapter Three is, however, the lack of
sufficient human and fmancial resources to carry out the task of the
Commission, which requires an enormous amount of detailed and exacting
work. The Constitution does not provide the Commission with direct access to
resources.
At present it appears that it is only in interaction between the State, the
NGOs, the Courts and the South African Human Rights Commission. that the
specific meaning of socio-economic rights in South Africa will become
consolidated in the course of time. If one of the key institutions, such as the
HRC, is seriously underfunded, if would undermine the system of protection of
human rights and socio-economic rights in particular.
Chapter Four examined the implementation of actual court orders in
South Africa. It was found that these order were unsatisfatorily implemented in
general. The analysis of cases illustrated quite clearly the passive role the Court
seems to have adopted in respect of the implementation of their own orders.
Although the Court has been able to give concrete guidelines and has
monitored the implementation of the orders in respect of civil and political
rights, it has failed to do so in respect of socio-economic rights. In the
Grootboom and TAC cases, the Court reprimanded the state by ordering the
government to honour its constitutional obligation but, as mentioned, it failed to
put proper mechanisms in place for the monitoring of its progressive orders.
3. RECOMMENDATIONS
It IS not possible within the scope of this study to make detailed
recommendations. However, a number of general recommendations can be
made.
First, the structural interdict is by far the most effective form of relief for
a court to award in case of a failure to respect the positive dimension of socio-
economic rights. Our courts should make more use of this remedy.
Secondly, where the structural interdict is awarded, the Court must keep
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the case 'alive' after the judgement is handed down by incorporating timetables
pertaining to the implementation of the order into the judgment.
Thirdly, the appointment of monitors in the order is essential to ensure
that the judgment is properly implemented. Moreover, the Court has to guide the
Commission in a practical way on how to monitor orders, when to report back
and which NGOs to involve.
Fourthly, it follows that the SAHRC should not take the task of the
implementation and monitoring of courts orders on alone. It should rather be co-
ordinating its own efforts and those ofNGOs in the field.
Fifthly, the Investigation Unit of the Commission needs to be
strengthened in order to enable it to undertake the necessary fact finding for
performing the envisaged function.
Finally, the SAHRC must keep a databank of the government's reactions
to decisions of the Court.
5.4 CONCLUSION
The democratisation of South Africa has opened a window to allow a fresh
breeze into a dusty room. However, it seems increasingly likely that the wind
has not blown the dust from all the comers. South Africa has undergone a
rhetorical conversion. Having democracy in name and rights on paper means
very little if it does not change the lives of the people. But if socio-economic
rights cannot be implemented meaningfully through court orders, there is a
danger that South Africa may use human rights talk to keep up appearances.
This leads back to the central theme of this study, socio-economic rights cannot
be realised without the proper implementation of court orders.
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